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 Abstract 
The “Third Wave” of global democratization, which began in 1974, now appears to be 
drawing to a close. While the number of “electoral democracies” has tripled since 1974, the 
rate of increase has slowed every year since 1991 (when the number jumped by almost 20 
percent) and is now near zero. Moreover, if we examine the more demanding standard of 
“liberal democracy”  – in which there is substantial individual and associational freedom, civic 
pluralism, civilian supremacy over the military, a secure rule of law, and “horizontal 
accountability” of office-holders to one another  – we observe today the same proportion of 
liberal democracies in the world as existed in 1991. If a “third reverse wave” of democratic 
erosion or breakdowns is to be avoided, the new democracies of the third wave will need to 
become consolidated. Elites and citizens of every major party, interest, and ethnicity must 
accept the legitimacy of democracy and of the specific constitutional rules and practices in 
place in their country. In many new democracies, this requires a sweeping agenda of 
institutional reform to widen citizen access to power, control corruption, and improve the 
depth and quality of democracy. Elsewhere  – as in China and Indonesia  – rapid economic 
development and the gradual emergence of stronger, more autonomous civil associations 
and legal and representative institutions may be laying the foundations for a “fourth wave” of 
democratization at some point in the early twenty-first century. 
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Since the early 1980s, the most significant trend in world politics has been the steady growth 
in the number of democratic regimes in the world, and the consequent decline in the 
prevalence of various forms of authoritarian rule. The trend actually began with the 
overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship in April of 1974, and then the democratization of 
Greece and Spain as well in the following two years, but it did not really become global until 
it reached Latin America in the late 1970s and early 80s, and then several parts of Asia in the 
mid- to late 1980s. By the time it brought down European communist regimes at the end of 
the 1980s, the world was in a state of democratic euphoria, and in the subsequent several 
years democratic change swept through the Soviet Union and sub-Saharan Africa as well. 
In a seminal formulation, Samuel Huntington has dubbed this post-1974 trend the “third 
wave” of global democratic expansion, and has shown the central importance to it of regional 
and international demonstration effects.
1 So powerful has this wave been that it has by one 
count doubled and another count tripled the number of democracies in the world. By the 
more demanding count, there were 79 democracies at the beginning of 1997; by the more 
expansive count, 118.  
As I will argue below,  how  one counts encompasses profound conceptual  – and by 
extension, normative, philosophical, and policy  – issues in contemporary comparative 
politics. It raises one of the most important questions we can ask in this, history’s most 
vigorous wave of democratization: what is democracy? And this in turn is essential to 
understanding the underlying trajectory of this wave, and to assessing whether it will 
continue – whether, in fact, it has not already effectively come to an end.  
Huntington defines a “wave of democratization” simply as “a group of transitions from 
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that 
significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period.”
2 He identifies 
two previous waves of democratization (a long slow wave from 1828 to 1926 and a second 
post-WWII wave, from 1943–1964). Significantly, each of the first two waves ended with 
what he calls a “reverse wave” of democratic breakdowns (1922–42, 1961–75). In each of 
these two previous reverse waves, some but not all of the newly established (or 
reestablished) democracies broke down. Overall, in each reverse wave, the number of 
democracies in the world decreased significantly but left more democracies in place than 
had existed prior to the start of the previous democratic wave. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1 
  States are listed in order of their average freedom house score at the end of 1996. For the scores, see 
Freedom Review  28, no. 1   (January-February 1997), pp. 15–16. All “free states” are listed here as liberal 
democracies. A listing of all electoral democracies is obtained from Freedom House. Classification of the remaining 
countries into “pseudodemocracies” and “authoritarian regimes” is by the judgement of the author 
2   Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. (Norman and London: 
University of Oklahoma Press. 1991): p. 15. 2 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
The first two waves lasted for no more than fifteen to twenty years. It has been 23 years 
since the third wave began. Will it continue? Is it over? Is a third reverse wave on the horizon 
– or at some point inevitable? Few questions are more important to the study of world politics 
– and to the future not only of political freedom and human rights, but, very probably, of 
international peace as well.
3 
1. Conceptualizing Democracy 
Much of the contemporary confusion and debate about the number of democracies in the 
world, the classification of specific regimes, the conditions for making and consolidating 
democracy, and the consequences of democratic regimes for peace and development, 
stems from a lack of consensus about just what we mean by “democracy.” So serious is the 
conceptual confusion in the literature that David Collier and Steven Levitsky have identified 
more than 550 “subtypes” of democracy in their review of some 150 (mostly recent) studies.
4 
Some of these nominal subtypes merely identify specific institutional features or types of full 
democracy, but many denote “diminished” forms of democracy. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
3  There is a vast and rapidly growing literature on the “democratic peace.” It, too, depends on how one 
conceptualizes democracy. If we eliminate dubious historical cases of “democracy” (such as Britain in 1812 or the 
Kaiser’s Germany in World War I), I believe the evidence shows convincingly that, at a minimum, modern 
democracies (and especially liberal democracies, as I define the term below) have not gone to war with one another, 
and for compelling theoretical reasons, are extremely unlikely to do so in the future. For a recent overview and 
assessment, see James Lee Ray, “The Democratic Path to Peace,” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 2 (April 1997): 49–
64, and Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1995). For a particularly important, influential (and succinct) theoretical and 
empirical investigation, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World 
(Princeton University Press, 1993).  A seminal earlier treatment, building on Immanuel Kant’s thesis of republics as 
the basis of perpetual peace, is Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part I” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983): 205–235, and Part II, ibid, pp. 323–353.  For a more wide-ranging analysis, which 
exhaustively reviews the existing literature and departs from much of it in suggesting that democracies are 
intrinsically less inclined toward aggressive violence, see the many works by Rudolph J. Rummel, including his 
forthcoming Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence; Understanding Conflict and War: Vol. 4: War, 
Power, and Peace (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976) and Understanding Conflict and War: Vol. 5: The Just 
Peace (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981). For his most recent evidence showing that democracies are 
generally “less warlike” (and totalitarian regimes the most so), as indicated by their mean battle dead in war, see R. 
J. Rummel, “Democracies ARE Less Warlike than Other Regimes,” European Journal of International Relations 1, 
no. 4 (December 1995), pp. 547–479.  Evidence that transitional regimes (moving from autocracy or a mixed regime 
toward democracy) are more inclined toward interstate war than stable democracies or autocracies is presented in 
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 79–
97, and “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5–38. They 
place heavy emphasis on the “mass nationalist sentiment” that is often unleashed or stimulated and exploited by 
ruling elites in the shift to electoral politics with universal suffrage. Nevertheless, they conclude that “the cure is 
probably more democracy, not less,” and that in critical cases where transitions toward democracy brought war, “the 
arrival of full democracy has produced more pacific policies” (“Democratization and War,” p. 95). 
4  David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy ‘With Adjectives’: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative 
Research.” Unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, April 8, 1996. 
This is a revised version of their paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, New York, September 1–4, 1994. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 3 
Where conceptions of democracy diverge fundamentally (but not always very explicitly) 
today is on the range and extent of political properties encompassed by democracy. 
Minimalist definitions descend from Joseph Schumpeter, who defined democracy as a 
system “for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”
5 Huntington, among others, explicitly 
embraces Schumpeter’s emphasis on c ompetitive elections for effective power as the 
essence of democracy.
6 Over time, however, Schumpeter’s appealingly concise expression 
has required periodic elaboration (or what Collier and Levitsky call “precising”) to avoid 
inclusion of cases that do not fit the implicit meaning. 
The seminal elaboration has been Robert Dahl’s conception of “polyarchy,” which requires 
not only freedom to vote and contest for office, but freedom to speak and publish dissenting 
views, freedom to form and join organizations,  and alternative sources of information  – in 
other words, not just the political pluralism of multiple parties and candidates, but a broader 
societal pluralism that makes political opposition and participation truly meaningful.
7 
Minimalist conceptions of democracy, particularly more recent ones, usually acknowledge 
the need for minimum levels of freedom (of speech, press, organization, and assembly) in 
order for competition and participation to be meaningful. But typically, they do not devote 
much attention  to them, nor do they attempt to incorporate them into actual measures of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
5  Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 269. For a 
useful explication of Schumpeter’s thinking about democracy in this classic work, see David Held, Models of 
Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). For Schumpeter, Held explains, “the democratic citizen’s lot 
was, quite straightforwardly, the right periodically to choose and authorize governments to act on their behalf” 
(Models of Democracy, p. 165). Schumpeter was clearly uneasy with direct political action by citizens, warning “the 
electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede,” (p. 283 of Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy). 
Thus, his “case for democracy can support, at best, only minimum political involvement: that involvement which 
could be considered sufficient to legitimate the right of competing elites to rule” (Models of Democracy, p. 168). This 
is, indeed, as spare a notion of democracy as one could posit without draining the term of meaning. 
6  Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 5–13, especially p. 6, and “The Modest Meaning of Democracy,” in Robert A. 
Pastor, Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989), p. 15. For similar 
conceptions of democracy as based on competitive elections, see for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, Political 
Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981 ), p. 27 and Lipset, “The Social 
Requisites of Democracy Revisited, American Sociological Review 59, no. 1 (February 1994): 1; Juan J. Linz, The 
Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1978), pp. 5–6; J. Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979), pp. 7–15; G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 3; Tatu Vanhanen, The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study 
of 147 States, 1980–88 (New York: Crane Russak, 1990), pp. 17–18; Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An 
Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 16; Adam Przeworski, 
Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 10–11. 
7  Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 2–3. 
Dahl uses the term polyarchy in order to distinguish these systems from a more ideal form of democracy, “one of the 
characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens” (p. 2). 
For a perspective that rejects “whole-system” logic altogether and emphasizes both the democratic shortcomings of 
the established, industrialized constitutional polities and the democratic fragments in many autocratic polities, see 
Richard L. Sklar, “Towards a Theory of Developmental Democracy,” in Adrian Leftwich, ed., Democracy and 
Development: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 25–44. 4 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
democracy. Thus (consistent with most other efforts to classify or measure regimes), one of 
the most recent and important quantitative analyses, by Adam Przeworski and his 
colleagues, defines democracy simply as “a regime in which governmental offices are filled 
as a consequence of contested elections” (with the proviso that real contestation requires an 
opposition with some nontrivial chance of winning office, and that the chief executive office 
and legislative seats are filled by contested elections).
8 Such Schumpeterian conceptions – 
particularly common among Western policymakers tracking and celebrating the expansion of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
8  Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, “What Makes Democracies 
Endure?” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 (January 1996): 50–51. See also Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, 
“Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49, no. 2 (January 1997: 155–183). Their methodology is more 
comprehensively explained in Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, and Adam Przeworski, 
“Classifying Political Regimes for the ACLP Data Set,” Working Paper Number 4, Chicago Center on Democracy, 
University of Chicago, December 6, 1994. Many other approaches to conceiving and measuring democracy in 
quantitative, cross-national analyses have also tended to rely on indicators of competition and participation (whether 
dichotomous, categorical or continuous), but some of these were gravely flawed by their incorporation of 
substantively inappropriate indicators, such as voter turnout or political stability. (On this and other conceptual and 
methodological problems, see Kenneth A. Bollen, “Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps,” in 
Inkeles, Measuring Democracy, pp. 3–20). 
As an alternative approach that explicitly includes the behavioral, non-institutional dimensions of democracy, the 
combined Freedom House scales of political rights and civil liberties, described below, are increasingly being used 
in quantitative analysis. Moreover, several efforts have been made to construct scales of democracy that measure 
all three dimensions: electoral competition, participation (universal suffrage), and essential civil liberties. See in 
particular, Coppedge and Reinecke, “Measuring Polyarchy;” and Axel Hadenius, Democracy and Development 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and “Assessing Democratic Progress in Africa,” in Hadenius, ed., 
Democracy’s Victory and Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, forthcoming). The problem with 
these complex indices is that, in their faithfulness to the more liberal conception of democracy, they generate 
demands for data on multiple indicators that require subjective judgements and thus are very difficult and costly to 
gather and code (especially retrospectively) for every year over a long time period. Thus, they tend to be produced 
for one or two time points.  
While the Freedom House data is available annually, it goes back in time only to 1972, and the criteria for scoring 
have become stricter over time (particularly in the 1990s), creating problems for interpreting changes in scores over 
time. The appeal of a simple dichotomous measure such as that used by Przeworski and his colleagues is precisely 
the relative simplification of data collection and regime classification, and the ability to conduct a straightforward 
“event history” analysis that analyzes changes to and away from democratic regime forms, or put differently, “hazard 
rates” of democratic life expectancy. Certainly, there is value in multiple methodological approaches; our knowledge 
of the determinants of democracy is likely to become more reliable and robust to the extent that different indicators 
and methodologies point to similar findings. Encouragingly, the Freedom House ratings and other measures of 
democracy appear generally highly correlated with one another (Alex Inkeles, “Introduction,” in Measuring 
Democracy, p. 4; and Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, “Tracking Democracy’s Third Wave with the Polity III 
Data,” Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 4 (1995), Table III, p. 475. Also, Hadenius finds that his measures of 
electoral competition and participation are generally highly correlated with political freedoms. In fact, Przeworski et 
al. report that the Freedom House combined ratings for 1972 to 1990 predict 93 percent of their regime 
classifications during this period (“What Makes Democracies Endure?” p. 52). 
Still, both a methodological and a political concern remain. As the evidence below indicates, there appears to be a 
recent growing divergence since 1990 between the formal properties and the liberal substance of democracy. Thus 
the substantive validity of measures which focus mainly on formal competition may be particularly suspect after 
1990 (which, interestingly, is the current endpoint of the Przeworski et al. data set). Moreover, it is likely (particularly 
when a dichotomous indicator of democracy is in question) that the divergence with other (more continuous and 
civil-liberties-based) scales is clustered precisely among “marginal” regimes that have real electoral competition but 
weak protection for individual and group rights. So long as the intercorrelations among different democracy scales 
remain high, this problem (in and of itself) will probably not be large enough to call into question the validity of these 
studies’ findings concerning the causes and consequences of democracy (especially when different democracy 
measures yield similar findings). But the dichotomous conception is intrinsically prone to neglect the quality of 
democracy, especially the state of civil liberties, and this has major policy implications. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 5 
democracy  – risk committing what Terry Karl has called the “fallacy of electoralism”  – of 
privileging electoral over other dimensions of democracy and ignoring the degree to which 
multiparty elections, even if competitive and uncertain in their outcome, may exclude 
significant sections of the population from the effective capacity to contest for power or 
advance and defend their interests, and/or may leave significant arenas of decision-making 
power beyond the reach or control of elected officials.
9 As Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl 
emphasize: “However central to democracy, elections occur intermittently and only allow 
citizens to choose between the highly aggregated alternatives offered by political parties, 
which can, especially in the early stages of a democratic transition, proliferate in a 
bewildering variety.”
10 
As Collier and Levitsky note, minimalist, procedural definitions of democracy have expanded 
in recent years to rule out the latter element of ambiguity or misclassification; many are now 
more precise in excluding from classification as democracies regimes which suffer 
substantial “reserved domains” of military (or bureaucratic, or oligarchical) power that are not 
accountable to elected officials.
11 On such grounds, Guatemala in particular has often been 
dismissed as a “pseudo” or “quasi” democracy. But still such formulations can fail to give due 
weight to levels of political repression and marginalization that may exclude significant 
segments of the population  – typically the poor or ethnic and regional minorities  – from 
exercising their democratic rights of opposition and participation. One of the most rigorously 
constructed and widely used measures of democracy in cross-national, quantitative research 
(that used in the Polity datasets of Ted R. Gurr and his colleagues) acknowledges civil 
liberties as a major conceptual component of democracy, but, because of the paucity of data 
(especially going back in time), does not incorporate them explicitly into the empirical scale 
of democracy.
12 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
9  Terry Lynn Karl, “Imposing Consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in El Salvador,” in Elections and 
Democratization in Latin America, 1980–1985, Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds. (San Diego: Center for Iberian 
and Latin American Studies, Center for US/Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1986), pp. 9–36, 
“Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America, Comparative Politics 23, no. 1 (October 1990), pp. 14–15, and “The 
Hybrid Regimes of Central America,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 3 (July 1995), pp. 72–86. 
10  Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is... And is Not,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 3 
(Spring 1991): 78. 
11  A seminal discussion of reserved domains appears in J. Samuel Valenzuela, “Democratic Consolidation in 
Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process and Facilitating Conditions,” in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O‘Donnell 
and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in 
Comparative Perspective  (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 64–66. See also 
Huntington,  The Third Wave, p. 10; Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is... And Is Not,” p. 81; Guillermo 
O‘Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (April 1996), pp. 34–51; and Juan J. Linz 
and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and 
Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), ch. 1, where they insist that a 
democratic transition is completed only when the freely elected government “de facto has the authority to generate 
new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have 
to share power with other bodies de jure.” (Quoted from the manuscript version).  
12  On the new, Polity III dataset, see Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, “Tracking Democracy’s Third Wave with 
the Polity III Data,” Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 4 (1995), pp. 469–482. On the earlier, Polity II data (from 
which about half of the annual country scores for 1946–86 have been (mostly slightly) corrected, and all updated to 6 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
Freedom represents a continuum of variation; whereas competitive elections tend to be more 
clearly present or not, individual and group rights of expression, organization, and assembly 
may vary to many degrees across countries that all have regular, genuinely competitive, 
multiparty elections in which votes are (more or less)  honestly counted and the winning 
candidates exercise (most of the) effective power in the country. For example, how large and 
overtly repressed or marginalized must a minority be before for the political system to be 
disqualified as a polyarchy, or in my terms, a  liberal  democracy?
13 Is Turkey disqualified 
because of the indiscriminate violence it has used to suppress a ruthless Kurdish insurgency, 
and its historical constraints (recently relaxed) on the peaceful expression of Kurdish political 
                                                                                                                                          
1994, in Polity III), see Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore, “The Transformation of the Western 
State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power since 1800,” in Inkeles, ed., Measuring Democracy, 
pp. 69–104. Although it does not measure civil liberties, the democracy measure of the polity datasets does not stop 
at measuring the openness and competitiveness of elections (including specifically executive recruitment). 
Significantly, it also measures (with increased sensitivity in Polity III) institutional constraints on the exercise of 
executive power (which captures to a considerable degree the existence of “horizontal accountability”). This is a 
significant step beyond measures that focus exclusively on competitive elections. Jaggers and Gurr argue in their 
1995 article that even though they do not measure civil liberties and the rule of law directly, their measures of formal 
institutional structure more or less capture this behavioral dimension, and that their scale therefore correlates highly 
(in the years and countries for which it overlaps) with others that do measure civil liberties directly (with subjective 
scorings). Empirically, this claim is substantially true, although, as one would expect, their democracy measure 
correlates slightly more highly with Freedom House’s political rights scale (.92) than with its civil liberties scale (.87).  
By contrast, the Coppedge and Reinecke polyarchy scale correlates .93 with both Freedom House scales, and 
these two scales together constitute the best indicator of what I term below “liberal democracy.” Whenever 
alternative scales rest on subjective scoring, correlations above .80 or so must be regarded as impressive evidence 
of the empirical validity of the measures. Still, to repeat our point in the note above, in the variation that remains 
(and the different strategies for aggregating regimes with diverse scores into a few types) may cluster critical cases 
of divergent coding that bear important theoretical and policy implications. For example, Jaggers and Gurr 
decompose regimes in 1994 into “coherent” and “incoherent” democracies and autocracies. “Incoherent 
democracies denote those political systems with primarily democratic elements that also place substantial limits on 
participation, competition, and/or civil liberties” (p. 478). Their 19 incoherent democracies in 1994 include a few 
regimes (such as Senegal, Cambodia, and Belarus) where the level of ruling party dominance and intolerance is 
such that even the minimal Schumpeterian criteria for electoral democracy are lacking. More significantly for the 
purposes of this discussion, their list of “incoherent democracies” excludes (and counts as “coherent democracies”) 
some civilian, electoral regimes that suffer very substantial abridgements of human rights and the rule of law, such 
as India, Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine. (For their list, see note 16, p. 481. In a private communication based on my 
inquiry, Gurr has indicated that Sri Lanka and probably Pakistan should have been included in their list of incoherent 
democracies for the early 1990s. For evidence of these abridgements, see the relevant country reports in the annual 
volumes of Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, cited below). 
13  I use the term “liberal,” of course to refer not to an economic regime with a limited state and an open economy, 
but to a form of political democracy in which individual and group liberties are particularly strong and well protected. 
There is obviously some affinity between economic and political liberty in these senses, but there are tensions and 
complexities as well that are well beyond the scope of this discussion. The term “liberal” should also be construed 
here very broadly, even in the political sense. It requires sufficient civil liberties and pluralism to allow for free and 
meaningful competition of interests and a rule of law between elections as well as in them. But this still leaves very 
substantial scope for variation in the balance a society places on individual rights vs. responsibilities, or to put it 
another way, on the emphasis on the individual vs. the community. Requiring by definition that the individual be free 
to organize and speak, and protected from arbitrary arrest and torture, does not mean that a society must embrace 
a libertarian (as opposed to communitarian) notion of the proper political and social order. In this sense, I believe the 
thesis that “liberal democracy” is inappropriate for and unworkable in Confucian and other East Asian societies is 
wrong theoretically, and it is certainly being proven wrong empirically in South Korea and Taiwan. See my “Some 
Democratic Lessons in The ‘Asian Vaules Debate,’“ paper presented to the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Association 
for Asian Studies, Honolulu, April, 1996. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 7 
and cultural identity? Is India disqualified because of alarming human rights violations by its 
security forces in secessionist Kashmir; or Sri Lanka because of the brutal excesses by both 
sides in the secessionist war of Tamil guerillas; or Russia when it waged a savage war 
against Chechen secessionists; or Colombia because of its internal war against drug-
traffickers and left-wing guerillas, and its exceptionally high levels of political assassination 
and other human rights abuses? Do all these polities not have a right to defend themselves 
against violent insurgency and secessionist terror? Or does democracy fall short – despite 
highly competitive elections in each of these five countries, which have witnessed some 
degree of party alternation in each case in recent years – because of high levels of political 
violence, lawlessness, and corruption, by both state and non-state actors?
14 As I indicate 
below, the problem is not limited to these countries, but increasingly characterizes a 
distinctive and growing group of countries that are commonly considered “democracies” 
today.  
By a minimalist definition, all five of the above countries qualify as democracies. But by a 
stricter conception of “liberal democracy,” all fall short. All suffer sufficiently serious 
abridgements of political rights and civil liberties that they fail to qualify as “free” in the annual 
ratings by Freedom House. Moreover, this gap between minimal, formal, or what I will 
henceforth term “electoral” democracy and liberal democracy has serious consequences for 
theory, policy, and comparative analysis. These consequences derive not only from the 
question raised of the relationship between “democracy” and human rights, but also, as I will 
also show, from the dramatic growth in the gap between electoral and liberal democracy – 
one of the third wave’s most significant and little-noticed features. 
The formal conception  –  electoral democracy  –  defines democracy as a civilian, 
constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices are filled t hrough 
regular, competitive, multiparty elections. As we have seen, this conception remains highly 
salient for both scholarship and policy, but it has been amplified or “precised” to various 
degrees by different scholars and theorists. This exercise has been constructive, but 
unfortunately it has left behind a plethora of what Collier and Levitsky term “expanded 
procedural” conceptions, which do not clearly relate to one another and occupy various 
intermediate locations in the continuum between electoral and liberal democracy.
15 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
14  See the relevant country reports in Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1996 (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, December 1995), and its reports of preceding years; Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 
Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, November 1995); 
Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1994–1995 (New 
York: Freedom House, 1995), and the forthcoming and preceding annual Freedom House reports. 
15  Among the expanded procedural definitions that appear to bear a strong affinity to the conception of liberal 
democracy articulated here, but which are somewhat cryptic or ambiguous about the weight given to civil liberties, 
are Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” p. 2, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber 
Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, pp. 43–44 and 46. 8 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
How does  liberal  democracy extend beyond these formal and intermediate conceptions? In 
addition to regular, free, and fair electoral competition, and universal suffrage, it requires the 
absence of “reserved domains” of power for the military or other social and political forces 
that are not accountable to the electorate, directly or indirectly. Second, in addition to the 
“vertical” accountability of rulers to the ruled (which is secured most reliably through regular, 
free and fair, competitive elections), it requires “horizontal” accountability of office-holders to 
one another; this constrains executive power and so helps protect constitutionalism, the rule 
of the law, and the deliberative process.
16 Third, it encompasses extensive provisions for 
political and civic pluralism, as well as for individual and group freedoms, so that contending 
interests and values may be expressed and compete through various, ongoing processes of 
articulation and representation, beyond periodic elections.
17 S pecifically, liberal democracy 
has the following components:  
1.  Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies, in fact as well as in 
constitutional theory, with elected officials (and not democratically unaccountable actors 
or foreign powers); in particular, the military is subordinate to the authority of elected 
civilian officials. 
2.  Executive power is constrained, constitutionally and in fact, by the autonomous power of 
other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, parliament, and other 
mechanisms of horizontal accountability). 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
16  Obviously, the independent power of the legislature to “check and balance” executive power will differ markedly 
between presidential and parliamentary regimes. However, even in parliamentary regimes, democratic vigor 
requires striking a balance between disciplined parliamentary support for the governing party and independent 
capacity to scrutinize and question the actions of cabinet ministers and executive agencies. For the political quality 
of democracy, the most important additional mechanism of horizontal accountability is an autonomous judiciary, but 
crucial as well are institutionalized means (often in a separate, autonomous agency) to monitor, investigate, and 
punish government corruption at all levels. On the concept of “lateral” or “horizontal” accountability and its 
importance, see Richard L. Sklar, “Developmental Democracy,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 29, no. 
4 (1987), pp. 686–714, and “Towards a Theory of Developmental Democracy,” pp. 26–27; and Guillermo O‘Donnell, 
“Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (January 1994), pp. 60–62. Sklar terms the lateral form 
“constitutional democracy” and emphasizes its mutually reinforcing relationship to vertical accountability. 
17  This emphasis on the non-electoral dimensions of democracy, in the continuing play of interests in politics, 
figures especially prominently in the work of Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl. See, for example, their “What 
Democracy Is... and Is Not.” They list pluralism as a dimension on which regimes may simply be “differently 
democratic,” in that democratic corporatist arrangements may grant certain peak associations monopoly rights of 
representation, with obligatory membership within the interest sector and close linkages to the state. However, such 
corporatist arrangements are typically found within the limited functional arenas of capital and labor, and where they 
exist in democracies are supplemented by a pluralistic array of other organizations for representing other interests. 
Were all of associational and expressive life organized in this vertical, monopolistic way, I believe it might raise 
serious questions about the degree of democracy. In any case, fully corporatist regimes of interest representation 
are fading rather than flourishing in established democracies, and to the extent that new democracies adopt them, 
they tend to manifest more limited features of “policy concertation.” On the distinction and trends as they relate to 
post-communist Eastern Europe, see Jonathan Terra, “Policy Concertation, Interest Representation, and 
Democratic Consolidation in Postcommunist East Central Europe.” Unpublished manuscript, Department of Political 
Science, Stanford University, Winter 1996. On the greatly limited character of neocorporatist forms of interest 
representation in the new democracies of Southern Europe, see Philippe C. Schmitter, “Organized Interests and 
Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe,” in Gunther, Diamandours, and Puhle, eds.,  The Politics of 
Democratic Consolidation, pp. 284–314. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 9 
3.  Not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a significant opposition vote and the 
presumption of party alternation in government over time, but no group which adheres 
to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections 
(even if electoral thresholds and other rules exclude smaller parties from winning 
representation in parliament). 
4.  Cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups (as well as traditionally 
disadvantaged or disempowered majorities) are not prohibited (legally or in practice) 
from expressing their interests in the political process, and from using their language 
and culture.  
5.  Beyond parties and intermittent elections, citizens have multiple, ongoing channels and 
means for the expression and representation of their interests and values, including a 
diverse array of autonomous associations, movements, and groupings which they have 
the freedom to form and join.
18 
6.  In addition to associational freedom a nd pluralism, there exist alternative sources of 
information (including independent media) to which citizens have (politically) unfettered 
access. 
7.  Individuals also have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, 
publication, assembly, demonstration, and petition. 
8.  Invidual citizens are politically equal under the law and in their rights to participate in 
the political process (even though they are invariably unequal in their political 
resources). 
9.  Individual and group liberties are effectively protected by an independent, 
nondiscriminatory judiciary whose decisions are enforced and respected by other 
centers of power. 
10.  The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture or 
undue interference in their personal lives not only by the state but by organized anti-
state forces as well.
19 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
18  This is a particular emphasis of Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is... And Is Not,” pp. 78–80, but it has 
long figured prominently in the work and thought of democratic pluralists such as Robert A. Dahl. In addition to his 
Polyarchy, see for example, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), and Dilemmas of Pluralist 
Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). 
19  I suspect there would be very substantial overlap between the list of regimes identified by these criteria and 
those regimes indicated by the two simpler and less formal standards proposed by Laurence Whitehead: “How does 
a purportedly democratic regime treat those held in its prisons? Would we describe the regime as sufficiently 
democratic to qualify as a leading western democracy?” A key point of my long conceptual discussion here is 10 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
These ten elements of liberal democracy comprise most of the criteria by which Freedom 
House annually rates political rights (of contestation, opposition, and participation) and civil 
liberties in every country of the world. Political rights and civil liberties are each measured on 
a seven-point scale, with a rating of 1 indicating the most free and 7 the least free. 
Combining the two scales (as a number of recent quantitative analyses of the determinants 
of democracy have done), produces a total score ranging from 2 to 14, or an average score 
from 1 to 7. Countries averaging 2.5 or lower are considered “free” by Freedom House; 
those scoring 3 to 5 are “partly free”; and those from 5.5 to 7 are “not free.”
20 
The “free” rating in the Freedom House survey is the best, most sensitive and objective 
empirical indicator available of “liberal democracy.” Of course, with any multi-point scale, 
there is inevitably some arbitrariness in where one draws the line to establish the threshold 
for a concept. However, there are real differences even between the 2.5 and 3.0 average 
rating, which is the cutting point of the threshold. In the 1996–97 Freedom House survey, all 
eleven countries with the lowest “free” score of 2.5 rate a 2 on political rights and a 3 on civil 
liberties (and this has been true for some number of years now in the annual freedom 
surveys). The difference between a 2 and a 3 on political rights is very real, typically 
indicating significantly more military influence in politics, electoral and political violence, 
and/or electoral irregularities, and thus political contestation that is appreciably less, free, 
fair, inclusive, and meaningful. This is the case, for example, in El Salvador and Honduras 
(both rated 3 on political rights and 3 on civil liberties); in Venezuela, where military 
autonomy and impunity and political intimidation have eroded the quality of democracy in 
recent years, but then abated to bring the country back to free status in 1996; and in 
Thailand, where dubious electoral practices (including widespread vote-buying) and the 
autonomous political power of the military (though significantly reduced since 1992) continue 
to place the country just below the “free” threshold.
21 The difference between 2 and 3 on civil 
                                                                                                                                          
precisely Whitehead’s: “It would be a grave disservice to the cause of democratic consolidation to misapply the term 
to regimes that fall short of a well-anchored standard.” “The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies: A Discussion 
with Illustrations,” in Pastor, Democracy in the Americas, p. 77. 
20  For a full explanation of the survey methodology, see Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual 
Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1994–1995 (New York: Freedom House, 1995), pp. 672–677, or 
Freedom Review (January-February 1997), pp. 192–202. The two freedom scores derive from raw point scores. 
These are constructed by assigning 0 to 4 points to each country on each of 13 checklist items for civil liberties and 
each of eight check list items for political rights. The 1994 political rights scores included a ninth checklist item – 
decentralization of political power – that was appropriately dropped from the most recent survey, since it is better 
viewed as a measure of differences in the type rather than degree of liberal democracy. This is reflective of subtle 
(and in some years) significant changes in survey methodology that have occurred from time to time and that do, 
admittedly, complicate interpretation of changes in country scores over time (especially going back more than five or 
six years). Until 1995, the dividing line between “partly free” and “not free” was along the raw point score for the 5.5 
average freedom score. In the most recent survey, for 1996, all countries with an average score of 5.5 or lower are 
rated “not free.” 
21  See, for example, the country reports on these countries in the recent annual volumes of Freedom in the World 
and the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Thailand’s King has formal and especially 
informal power somewhat greater than in the pure constitutional monarchies, but this power has been exercised in 
recent years more to preserve or restore constitutional democracy than to constrain it. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 11 
liberties is also significant, as the lower-rated countries have at least one area  – such as 
freedom of speech or the press, personal security from terror and arbitrary arrest, and 
associational freedom and autonomy – where liberty is significantly constrained. Still, political 
rights are strong enough to render the system generally “free” (if just barely). When a country 
(such as Brazil) with a 2 on political rights scores a 4 on civil liberties, however, human rights 
violations are so serious and widespread, the military and police are so immune to 
accountability for them, the judicial system is so ineffectual and corrupt, and/or the poor and 
landless are so systematically victimized by wealthy elites, that the political system cannot 
be considered liberal and free, even though it is democratic in the strictly political arena of 
elections and party politics.
22 Now that India is now rated a “2” on political rights, it is the 
most prominent example of this somewhat unusual combination, featuring a vigorously 
competitive (indeed, increasingly fragmented) multiparty electoral system, and a robust civil 
society, but widespread abuses by police and security forces and state harassment of 
activists from various popular organizatiosn (concerned with the environment, social justice, 
indigenous peoples, and human rights). For this reason, Human Rights Watch has called 
India “one of the most dangerous places in the world for human rights activists.”
23  
It is precisely in the categorization of specific countries at specific times that the differences 
between conceptual approaches becomes most apparent. But as I have noted above, 
conceptual approaches are no longer easily dichotomized into “electoral” and “liberal” 
approaches. There is a class of conceptions of democracy that fall somewhere in between, 
explicitly incorporating basic civil freedoms of expression and association, and trying to take 
serious empirical account of them, yet still allowing for sharp constrictions of citizenship 
rights and a porous, insecure rule of law. The crucial distinction turns on whether political 
and civil freedoms are seen as relevant mainly to the extent that they ensure meaningful 
electoral competition and participation, or are instead viewed as necessary to ensure a wider 
range of democratic functions. 
A particularly clear example of the mid-range conception may be found in Juan Linz’s 
definition of democracies as “political systems that allow the free formulation of political 
preferences through the use of basic freedoms of association, information and 
communication for the purpose of a free competition between leaders to validate at regular 
intervals, by nonviolent means, the claim to rule without excluding any office of national 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
22   Ibid, pp. 152–155. Similar problems of human rights violations (by insurgents as well as the state), judicial 
weakness and corruption, and oligarchical violence against the powerless give the Philippines the same 2 and 4 
rating in 1996. 
23  Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Annual Report 1997 (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 
1996), 158. Of course, it is precisely the constitutional freedom to organize and the multiplicity of human rights 
groups in India that makes possible the widespread contestation over human rights violations (and thus the danger 
to the lives of human rights activists). China, Cuba, Syria, and Iran are far more inhospitable places for human rights 
activists, but are so much more repressive that such groups are quashed before they can organize. 12 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
decision-making from that competition.”
24 Here, a Schumpeterian conception of democracy 
as political competition between alternative leaders has been expanded to rule out reserved 
domains of power and to require that electoral competition be underpinned by basic political 
freedoms. But this leaves open the extent to which civil liberties will otherwise be protected. 
Thus, the scope of human rights or civil rights in democracies might vary considerably 
depending on the wishes of the majority, as long as basic freedoms to contest politically 
remain unquestioned and the rights guaranteed in the a constitution are not restricted.”
25 
Although this conception encompasses the right to advocate alternatives, it could allow a 
democracy, by a constitutional process, to constrain civil liberties and minority rights more 
severely than would be consistent with the principle of  liberal democracy. As Linz makes 
clear, democracies are the form of government least likely to violate human rights, but may 
do so when under stress or confronted with terrorist or anti-system challenges. Yet, when 
democratic states turn to extensive human rights violations in order to defend themselves, 
they lose their liberal character (as has happened in Turkey and Sri Lanka, and in certain 
Indian states such as Kashmir). This is why violent antidemocratic or secessionist 
movements are a particular problem for liberal democracy, and why liberal democracies 
need to act early and creatively to meet potential challenges if they are to preserve their 
liberal character.
26 It is also why Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, embracing greater conceptual 
precision, have in their latest theoretical work more explicitly stressed the rule of law as a 
fundamental requirement of democracy: “If freely elected executives... infringe the 
constittuion, violate the rights of individuals and minorities, impinge upon the legitimate 
functions of the legilsature, and thus fair to rule within the bounds of a state of law, their 
regimes are not democracies.”
27 
The mid-range conception is also articulated by Guillermo O‘Donnell in his latest theoretical 
reflection on democracy.
28 O‘Donnell carefully rules out the fallacy of electoralism and the 
inclusion of “reserved domains” by adopting Dahl's concept of polyarchy, with its requirement 
of basic civil freedoms, and then adding on further procedural requirements that elected 
officials have meaningful power. On the basis of these criteria, he thus properly excludes 
from his list of polyarchies in Latin America a number of quasi-democracies, such as the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala, Paraguay (and probably Peru, El Salvador and 
Honduras). This brings his classification close to my own listing of “liberal democracies” in 
Latin America (below). However, the “cutting point” in his articulation of “polyarchy” is 
focused on the institutionalization of elections, rather than the rule of law more broadly. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
24  Juan J. Linz, “Types of Political Regimes and Respect for Human Rights: Historical and Cross-national 
Perspectives,” in Asbjørn Eide and Bernt Hagtvet, eds., Conditions for Civilized Politics: Political Regimes and 
Compliance with Human Rights (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996), p. 186; see also p. 183. 
25  Ibid, p. 187. 
26  Thus Linz concludes that “[d]emocracies can fail in relation to human rights more by inaction than by action,” in 
neglecting acute social and economic problems and the violations of public order by antisystem groups. Ibid, p. 191. 
27  Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (April 
1996): 15. 
28  “Illusions about Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (April 1996): 34–51. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 13 
Indeed, the central point of his essay is to argue that many of the democracies of the third 
wave are polyarchies, and apparently  enduring polyarchies, even though clientelism and 
particularism abound, undermining horizontal accountability and adherence to formal rules.
29 
The institutionalization of elections requires surrounding conditions of freedom, but the 
cutting point appears to be their relevance for ensuring democratic  electoral competition. 
Thus, he concedes: 
In many of the new polyarchies, individuals are citizens only in relation to the one institution 
that functions in a manner close to what its formal rules prescribe  – elections. As for full 
citizenship, only the members of a privileged minority enjoy it.... Informally institutionalized 
polyarchies are democratic in the sense just defined.... But their liberal and republican 
components are extremely weak.
30 
The question of how extensive liberty must be b efore a political system can be termed a 
“liberal democracy” is a deeply normative and philosophical one. The key distinction involves 
the extent to which we define the political process as centering around elections or 
encompassing a much broader and more continuous play of interest articulation, 
representation, and contestation. If we view the latter as an  essential component of 
democracy, then there must be adequate political and civil freedoms surrounding that 
broader process as well, and, to use O‘Donnell’s language, individuals must be able to 
exercise their rights of citizenship not only in elections but in obtaining the “fair access to 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
29  Ibid, p. 36. As O‘Donnell concedes, “the definition of polyarchy is silent about important but elusive themes,” 
such as the degree of government accountability to citizens between elections, and “the degree to which the rule of 
law extends over the country’s geographic and social terrain.”  While O‘Donnell is sympathetic to the conception 
articulated here of “liberal democracy,” and sees a strong affinity with the way he has defined “polyarchy,” 
differences do derive from where one draws the “cutting point” on the continuum of civil and political freedom. Like 
many substantial conceptual approaches, O‘Donnell’s cutting point is the combination of “inclusive, fair, and 
competitive elections” and “basic accompanying freedoms,” which can be read (although O‘Donnell may not mean it 
to be read so restrictively) as freedoms to facilitate “inclusive, fair and competitive elections.” Ibid, p. 36. 
Until recently, the definition I have used with my colleagues, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, was largely 
identical to O‘Donnell’s in this respect.  In our twenty-six country study, Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988 and 1989), we defined democracy 
essentially in Dahl’s terms of competition, participation, and freedom, with the third dimension requiring “civil and 
political liberties... sufficient to ensure the integrity of competition and participation” (see the preface to any of the 
regional volumes, p. xvi). This can be read in more or less precisely the same terms as O‘Donnell’s definition: 
freedom sufficient to make electoral competition and participation meaningful, free, and fair. In our most recent 
conceptual treatment, we have tried to correct for this problem by specifying conditions closer to the conception of 
liberal democracy articulated here, namely: “A level of civil and political liberties... secured through political equality 
under a rule of law, sufficient to ensure that citizens (acting individually and through various associations) can 
develop and advocate their views and interests and contest policies and offices vigorously and autonomously.” Larry 
Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with 
Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 7.  
30  Ibid, p. 13. For a similar, mid-range conception of democracy that also builds on Dahl’s polyarchy, see 
Jonathan Hartlyn and Arturo Valenzuela, “Democracy in Latin America since 1930,” in Leslie Bethell, ed., Cambridge 
History of Latin America, Volume VI, Part II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 100–101. Their 
conception also emphasizes the procedures of contestation and participation, with adequate protection for freedoms 
of expression and association, but adds a third dimension, “constitutionalism,” which, in limiting the hegemony of 
electoral majorities and the powers of governmental authorities, overlaps with the “executive constraints” element of 
the Jaggers and Gurr democracy scale.  14 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
public agencies and courts” which is often denied in his informally institutionalized 
polyarchies.  
The distinction between political and civil freedom, on the one hand, and cultural freedom (or 
license) on the other is often confused in the debate over whether democracy is 
inappropriate for Asia (or East Asia, or Confucian Asia, or simply Singapore) because of 
incompatible values. Liberal democracy does not require the comprehensively exalted status 
of individual rights that obtains in Western Europe and especially the United States. Thus, 
one may accept many of the cultural objections of advocates of the “Asian values” 
perspective  – that “Western” democracies have shifted the balance too much in favor of 
individual rights and social entitlements over rights of the community and social obligations 
of the individual to the community – and still embrace the political and civic fundamentals of 
liberal democracy as articulated above.
31 
An appreciation of the dynamics of regime change and the evolution of democracy must 
allow for a third class of regimes that are less than even minimally democratic but distinct 
from the more conventional no-party or one-party authoritarian regimes. This requires a 
second “cutting point” between electoral democracies, which allow for free and fair elections 
between multiple political parties, and other electoral regimes that have multiple parties, and 
often many of the other constitutional features of electoral democracy, but which lack at least 
one basic requirement: a sufficiently fair arena of contestation so that the ruling party may be 
turned out of power. Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset and I have termed these regimes 
pseudodemocacies, “because the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such 
as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often in part to legitimate) the reality of 
authoritarian domination.”
32  
As I use the term here, there is wide variation among pseudodemocracies. They include 
what Linz, Lipset, and I termed “semidemocracies,” which more nearly approach electoral 
democracies in their pluralism and competitiveness, as well as what Giovanni Sartori has 
termed “hegemonic party systems,” in which a relatively institutionalized ruling party makes 
extensive use of coercion, patronage, media control, and other features to deny formally 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
31  For a perspective that does just this, see Joseph Chan, “Hong Kong, Singapore, and Asian Values: An 
Alternative View,” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 2 (April 1997), pp. 35–48. Sexual freedom, the freedom to distribute 
pornography, and the freedom of a woman to choose whether or not to abort her fetus may all be considered 
elements of a liberal society, but these issues involve value choices and beliefs that go well beyond the choice of a 
system of government. One can have a political system that clearly meets the ten criteria of liberal democracy I 
have outlined but which is culturally conservative or restrictive in some of the policies it sets. The key test is whether 
those who disagree with these policies have full civic and political freedom to mobilize to change them. 
32  Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, “What Makes for Democracy,” in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., Politics in 
Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 
8. See also Diamond, Linz and Lipset, Democracy in Developikng Countries: Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988 and 1989), p. xviii of the preface to each volume. Burton, Gunther, and Higley 
(“Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes, pp. 6 –7) also identify a class of electoral 
pseudodemocracies, but their usage differs from mine in including statutory one-party states.  I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 15 
legal opposition parties a fair and authentic chance to compete for power.
33 Another 
characteristic feature of such hegemonic party systems is that the ruling party regularly wins 
massively and controls the overwhelming bulk of legislative seats, and most governments at 
the regional and local levels. Mexico (until 1988), Senegal, and Singapore are classic 
examples of such a system. Here pseudodemocracy extends beyond such hegemonic party 
regimes, to encompass as well multiparty electoral systems in which the undemocratic 
dominance of the ruling party may be weak and contested (as in Kenya), or highly 
personalistic and poorly institutionalized (as in Kazakhstan), or in the process of 
decomposing into a more competitive system (as in Mexico).  
What distinguishes pseudodemocracies from other nondemocracies is that they tolerate the 
existence of at least some (and at least somewhat independent) opposition parties. Typically, 
this also is accompanied by more space for organizational pluralism and dissident activity in 
civil society than is tolerated in the most repressive authoritarian regimes.  Thus, as the 
Appendix shows, pseudodemocracies tend to have somewhat higher levels of freedom than 
other “authoritarian” regimes.
34 Invariably, pseudodemocracies fall well below the standard of 
liberal democracy, but they vary significantly in their repressiveness, and in their proximity to 
the threshold of electoral democracy. In its December 1996 national elections, Ghana 
crossed this crucial theshold with a process that was much more competitive (in large 
measure due to impartial administration and effective citizen monitoring).
35 With recent 
reforms to increase the autonomy of its electoral administration and growing assertiveness 
and organization among independent organizations (including election monitoring groups) in 
civil society, Mexico as well could cross this threshold in the presidential elections of the year 
2000. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
33  Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1976): 230–238. 
34  If we take seriously Collier’s and Levitsky’s appeal to work to clear away the mounting conceptual clutter in 
comparative democratic studies, it is useful for any effort at a typology of regimes to orient itself to other concepts, 
particularly “diminished subtypes” of democracy. Those subtypes which are missing the attribute of free elections or 
relatively fair multiparty contestation clearly fall into my category of “pseudodemocracies.” Those which have real 
and fair multiparty competition, but with limited suffrage, are not neatly placed in this framework, and would seem to 
constitute a separate type of “exclusionary,” “oligarchic,” or “limited suffrage” democracy. While this is a distinct 
regime type, it is not relevant to an analysis of regime variation in the third wave, because almost invariably, 
electoral regimes since the mid-1970s have been based on universal suffrage. Those regimes which are diminished 
by the absence of adequate civil liberties or civilian control of the military may nevertheless be electoral 
democracies; this is the case with what Terry Karl refers to as the “hybrid” regimes of Central America (see her 
article of that title, especially pp. 80–81). See in particular Collier and Levistky’s figure 4, which classifies different 
categories of diminished subtypes. Careful attention is needed to empirical application of concepts, however. For 
example, Donald Emmerson’s category of “illiberal democracy” would seem to be coincident with “electoral 
democracy” in my framework, and indeed it could be said that a principal reason why these regimes are merely 
“electoral” democracies is because they are illiberal. However, as he applies the concept to Southeast Asia, and 
especially to the two regimes he classifies as “one-party democracy,” Singapore and Malaysia, the convergence 
with my own framework breaks down. Civil and political freedoms are so constrained in these two countries that the 
minimum criterion of electoral democracy – a sufficiently level electoral playing field to give opposition parties a 
chance at victory – is not met. See Donald K. Emmerson, “Region and Recalcitrance: Rethinking Democracy 
through Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review 8, no. 2 (1995), pp. 223–248. 
35  See the articles on Ghana by E. Gyimah-Boadi and Terrence Lyons in the Journal of Democracy 8, no. 2 (April 
1997). 16 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
The distinction between the two types of nondemocratic regimes is important theoretically. If 
we view democracy in  developmental terms, as emerging in fragments or parts, by no fixed 
sequence or timetable, then the presence of legal opposition parties that may compete for 
power and win some seats in parliament, and of the greater space for civil society that tends 
to prevail in such systems, constitute important foundations for future democratic 
development.
36 Not only in Mexico and Ghana, but in Jordan, Morocco, and several other 
African states where former one-party dictators or military rulers engineered their reelection 
under pseudodemocratic conditions, these democratic fragments tend t o press out the 
boundaries of what is politically possible. And this increases the prospects for a 
breakthrough to electoral democracy. In a similar vein (in an earlier era), elite-dominated, 
restricted democracies in Chile, Venezuela, and Costa Rica gradually became more 
democratic as civil society organizations and capable, middle-class parties forged effective 
linkages with one another.
37 
This framework leaves, then, a fourth, residual category, which I term simply “authoritarian 
regimes.” Such regimes vary in their levels of freedom (see again the Appendix), and may 
even hold fairly somewhat competitive elections, as in Uganda (and previously several other 
one-party African regimes).
38 They may have some modest civil society and judicial 
autonomy. Or they may be extremely closed and repressive, even totalitarian. But all of them 
lack a crucial building block of democracy: formally legal and independent opposition parties. 
Significantly, all of the most repressive regimes in the world, as measured by Freedom 
House, fall in this category. 
It should be emphasized that this four-fold typology is a system for classifying national 
political regimes, but political reality on the ground does not admit so neatly of such 
classifications. The level of democracy may vary significantly across sectors and institutional 
arenas (as would be expected if democracy emerges “in parts”). It may also vary 
considerably across territory within the national state. Thus, some states in India manifest 
not only generally better, more efficient and accountable governance, but also better 
protection for civil liberties and lower levels of electoral and political violence, than other 
states. The states of Karnataka, Kerala, Gujarat,and West Bengal might thus properly be 
considered more liberally democratic than the states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
36  Both the term “developmental” and my emphasis on the continuous and open-ended nature of change in the 
character, degree, and depth of democratic institutions owe heavily to the work of Richard L. Sklar: “Developmental 
Democracy,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 29, no. 4 (1987) pp. 686–714, and “Towards a Theory of 
Developmental Democracy.” Readers will nevertheless note important differences in our perspectives. 
37  Terry Lynn Karl, “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 3 (July 1995),  
pp. 82–83. 
38  In fact, a comprehensive typology would have to distinguish the one-party or no-party electoral regime as a 
different type of pseudodemocracy, where elections do not just ratify the nominations of the ruling party but have 
some potential to defeat incumbent legislators (at least) and to offer some means of vertical accountability to voters. 
Although this model was once common in Africa, however, today it is only practiced in Uganda. Everywhere else, 
the corruption and decadence that followed from the absence of opposition parties forced authoritarian regimes to 
liberalize at least to this cosmetic degree. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 17 
Bihar, for example.
39 In many Latin American countries as well, the worst abuses of human 
rights occur in the countryside, where local caciques may still be entrenched in their de facto 
power and guerilla forces and narcotraffickers have their main bases of support (or even, a 
state within a state). The treatment of African-Americans in the southern states prior to 1965 
is another case in point. Particularly with respect to large countries, it may be necessary to 
disaggregate to form a more sensitive picture of the quality and extent of democracy.  
2. Democracy in “Developmental” Perspective 
As the above discussion makes clear, even “liberal” democracies fall short of democratic 
ideals. At the less liberal end of the group, they may still have some serious flaws in their 
guarantees of personal and associational freedom. And certainly any casual acquaintance 
with the news from Italy, Japan, Belgium, France, the United States and most other 
industrialized democracies will underscore that even long-established and well 
institutionalized democracies with the most liberal average freedom scores of 1 or 1.5 are 
afflicted with serious problems of corruption, favoritism, and unequal access to political 
power, not to mention voter apathy, cynicism, and disengagement.
40 
There is not now and has never been in the modern world of nation-states a perfect 
democracy  – where all citizens have roughly equal political resources, and government is 
completely or almost completely responsive to all citizens. This is why Dahl used the term 
“polyarchy” to characterize the more limited form of democracy that is realistically possible 
(to date) in the modern state.
41 An important intellectual trend of democracy’s third wave has 
been the increased “valorization” of (even limited) political democracy as an end in itself, and 
the growing tendency of scholars and intellectuals (even many of those who had once been 
on the Marxist and rejectionist left) to agree on the need for realism in what can be expected 
of democracy. Certainly, democracy does not produce all good things. As Juan Linz 
observed two decades ago, “political democracy does not necessarily assure even a 
reasonable approximation of what we would call a democratic  society, a society with 
considerable equality of opportunity in all spheres.”
42 As Schmitter and Karl have argued, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
39   I am grateful to Sunita Parikh for emphasizing this point to me. 
40  A problem with the Freedom House survey of “freedom in the world” is that the twin seven-point ratings of 
political rights and civil liberties are not able adequately to convey variation (across countries and over time within 
countries) at the extreme endpoints of the scales. Thus, some countries within the most free rating of 1,1 no doubt 
have better, more comprehensive protection for civil liberties, and a more generally liberal civil and political climate, 
than others. Denmark might compare favorably to Austria and the United States in this regard. At the most 
repressive end of the scale (7,7), variation between countries and over time is also masked. There is growing 
evidence, briefly addressed in my conclusion, that state power is somewhat more constrained and open to 
competition, particularly at local levels, in China today as compared to ten or twenty years ago, and there is certainly 
more societal pluralism and openness in China today than in North Korea, which has the same 7,7 rating. 
41  Dahl, Polyarchy, p. 2. 
42  Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 97. Emphasis is mine. 18 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
democracies are not necessarily more economically or administratively efficient, or more 
orderly and governable, than autocratic regimes.
43 But in allowing for civil and political 
freedom, and for the real possibility of selecting alternative governments and policies, and 
especially in the scope they provide for disadvantaged and disempowered groups to 
organize and mobilize politically, liberal democracies in particular provide over the long run 
better prospects for reducing social injustices and correcting mistaken policies and corrupt 
practices. 
It is important, then, not to interpret the achievement of democracy – even liberal democracy 
– as a terminal point in political evolution. Democracy should be viewed as a developmental 
phenomenon. Even where it exists, where a country is above the threshold of formal (or 
even liberal) democracy, democratic institutions can be improved and deepened, and may 
need to be consolidated (see below); political competition can be made fairer and more 
open; participation can become more inclusive and vigorous; citizens’ knowledge, resources, 
and competence can grow; elected (and appointed) officials can be made more responsive 
and accountable; civil liberties can be better protected and the rule of law become more 
efficient and secure.
44 Viewed in this way, continued democratic development is a challenge 
for all countries, including the U.S., and all democracies, new and established, could become 
more democratic than they now are. Obviously, the improvement and invigoration of 
democracy will not solve all social and economic problems societies face. But in widening 
the scope of public deliberation, empowering traditionally marginalized and alienated groups, 
and generally increasing citizen competence and government responsiveness, reforms that 
deepen and extend democracy may also increase the sophistication of mass publics and the 
legitimacy  – and hence governing capacity  – of elected officials.
45 Beyond this, increasing 
citizen competence and participation in the political process will have spillover effects into 
other arenas of social life (and vice versa). The general increase in civic engagement – of 
direct, active participation in all sorts of voluntary associations and community networks – in 
turn generates norms of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation that further reduce cynicism, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
43  Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is... And Is Not,” pp. 85–87. 
44  On the problem of civic competence and the challenges to improving it in contemporary, large-scale, complex, 
media-intensive, and information-saturated societies, see Robert A. Dahl, “The Problem of Civic Competence,” 
Journal of Democracy 3, no. 4 (October 1992), pp. 45–59. 
45  In their comparative study of the restructuring of property relations in postsocialist Eastern Europe, 
Postsocialist Pathways (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), Laszlo Bruszt and David Stark argue that policy 
coherence, effectiveness, and sustainability are fostered where executives are constrained and reform policies are 
negotiated between governments and “deliberative associations.” As evidence they cite in particular the different 
trajectories of economic reform and performance in the (more deliberative and successful) Czech Republic and (the 
more delegative and economically unstable) Hungary. This finding is particularly significant given the conventional 
view in the literature (and especially in international policy circles) that if painful economic restructuring is to be 
achieved under democracy, power must be “delegated” to technocratic elites in the executive branch who are then 
“insulated” from popular pressures and horizontal accountability. By contrast, Stark and Bruzst argue that the 
“extended accountability” emanating from broad consultation and deliberation generates a societal consensus that 
contributes not only to democracy but to policy effectiveness. See their forthcoming book, .... The notion of 
“extended accountability” was articulated by Stark in his presentation to the Stanford Seminar on Democratization, 
February 15, 1996. This view has an important kinship with Guillermo O‘Donnell’s analysis of the problems of 
“delegative democracy” (in his article of that title). I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 19 
encourage participation, and facilitate economic development, democratic stability,  and the 
resolution of social problems. Increasingly, social scientists are emphasizing that such 
“social capital” is a critical resource for dealing with the seemingly intractable problems of 
poverty, alienation, and crime in the United States and other industrialized democracies. In 
the absence of such social capital, “mutual distrust and defection, vertical dependence and 
exploitation, isolation and disorder, criminality and backwardness [reinforce] one another in 
... interminable vicious circles.”
46 
Viewed from a developmental perspective, the fate of democracy is open-ended. Democracy 
generally emerges in different “parts” or stages through many different paths and degrees in 
different countries, and electoral democracy is only one element of full political democracy.
47 
Moreoever, democratic development may move both ways. Just as electoral democacies 
can become more democratic  – more liberal, more constitutional, more competitive, more 
accountable, more inclusive, and more vigorously participatory – so they can also become 
more illiberal, abusive, corrupt, exclusive, narrow, unresponsive and unaccountable  – i.e., 
less democratic. And liberal democracies, too, may either improve or decline over time in 
their levels of political accountability, accessibility, competitiveness, and responsiveness. 
There is no guarantee that democratic development will be only in one direction, and much 
to suggest that all political systems (including democacies, liberal or otherwise) tend to 
become rigid, corrupt, and unresponsive over time in the absence of periodic reform and 
renewal.
48 Indeed, democracy may not only become diminished in its political quality over 
time, it may even effectively  disappear, not merely through the breakdown or overthrow of 
formal democratic institutions (e.g. by military or executive coup) but through more insidious 
processes of decay. This is a phenomenon – what may be termed the progressive “hollowing 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
46  Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1993), p. 181; see also Putnam’s, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy 
6, no. 1 (Janaury 1995), pp. 65–78. On the reciprocity between a vigorous civil society and an effective democratic 
state, see also Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 
5, no. 3 (July 1994), pp. 4–17. 
47  Sklar, “Developmental Democracy.” Although Sklar’s approach is very different than that of the “transitions” 
school, as exemplified (with important variations) by the work of such people as Juan Linz, Guillermo O‘Donnell, 
Philippe Schmitter, Terry Karl, and Samuel Huntington, even this school acknowledges that “democratization” of 
authoritarian regimes is typically preceded by “liberalization,” in which (to use Sklar’s language) important parts or 
“fragments” of democracy may emerge, and press forward for further democratization. Sklar’s view is quite 
distinctive, however, in viewing democratic development as a continuous process, rather than the crossing of a 
threshold of regime type. See also his “Towards a Theory of Developmental Democracy.” 
48  Such a developmental perspective may help to innoculate democratic theory against the tendency toward 
teleological thinking that Guillermo O‘Donnell discerns in the literature on democratic consolidation: that is, the 
underlying assumption that there is a particular natural path and end state of democratic development (“Another 
Institutionalization”). This innoculation is important not only because, as O‘Donnell notes, the new democracies of 
the East and South may look very different than those of Europe and North America (even when they become 
institutionalized), but even more so, I would argue, because there is no endpoint of democratic development. Thus, 
as I will indicate below, while I differ from O‘Donnell in believing that the concept of democratic “consolidation” is 
meaningful and useful, it is only so in denoting a threshold of political legitimacy and stability that is not irreversible. 
Moreoever, even when it remains thoroughly consolidated, democracy can always become stronger or weaker, fuller 
or thinner. When it stagnates, and its citizens become politically apathetic and detached, it is likely to deteriorate. 
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out” of formal democracy – that is often neglected in contemporary discussions and is central 
to u nderstanding the trajectory of democratic change in the world over the last few years, as 
the following review of empirical trends will show. 
3. The Rise and Crest of the Third Wave 
By any conception, democracy has expanded dramatically since the third wave began in 
1974. If we take a minimalist or formal conception of democracy (in which governmental 
offices are filled through competitive, multi-party elections that place incumbents at real risk 
of defeat), both the number of democracies in the world and t he proportion of the world’s 
regimes that are democratic have increased dramatically since the third wave began. In 
1974, there were only 39 democracies total in the world, and only 28 with populations over 
one million (or so close to one million that they would exceed that mark by 1995).
49 Only 
about 23 percent of the countries over one million population and about 27 percent of all the 
world’s countries were formally democratic. The difference between these proportions raises 
an interesting relationship between size and democracy that has held continuously and 
become much more dramatic over the course of the third wave: very small countries (with 
populations of less than one million) are significantly more likely to be democratic (and free). 
Today, 57 percent of the 149 states with over one million population are electoral 
democracies, compared with 76 percent of the 42 smaller states; and among the (33) states 
with less than half a million population, 86 percent are democracies. Variation in the 
likelihood  of liberal democracy is even more striking: about one-third of states with one 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
49  Huntington counts 30 democracies in 1973 with populations over one million, but does not list the countries he 
classifies. Presumably he does not count as democracies the Chilean and Uruguayan regimes that broke down in 
1973, so the discrepancy could be due to his classification of some ambiguous regimes (notably Malaysia) as 
democratic at the time. In classifying ambiguous regimes in 1974, I follow Przeworski’s principle that “(d)emocracy is 
a system in which parties lose elections” (Democracy and the Market, p. 10). In ambiguous cases, I have classified 
civilian, multiparty, electoral regimes as democratic only if the ruling party lost power in an election at some point, or 
clearly allowed itself to be at risk of electoral defeat. Mexico, Singapore, Malaysia (after 1969) and Senegal all failed 
this rule in 1974. For the 1990s, I simply accept Freedom House’s classification of regimes as formally democratic 
or not, but it also appears to follow this principle. In 1995, it classifies as nondemocracies a number of civilian, 
multiparty, electoral regimes; in addition to the above four (still), Ghana, Gabon, Cameroon, Kenya, Zimbabwe, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Despite the presence of multiparty electoral competition, these countries are 
nondemocracies (even in the minimalist sense) because the ruling party in each case is so dominant (or in Giovanni 
Sartori’s classic framework, “hegemonic”) that it does not allow the opposition any kind of fair chance to defeat it 
electorally (or challenge it in between elections). This failure to qualify as formally democratic does not derive 
merely from the low civil liberties or average freedom scores of these countries; a number of the formal democracies 
in 1995 (such as Turkey, Moldova, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and such longtime democracies as India, Sri Lanka, and 
Colombia) have average freedom scores in 1995 of 4 to 5, no better than a number of the electoral nondemocracies 
above. The key distinction in these ratings of formal democracy is, then, as Przeworski and his colleagues frame it: 
“an opposition that has some chance of winning office as a consequence of elections” (“What Makes Democracies 
Endure? p. 50). For a full listing of regimes, see the Appendix. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 21 
million population are liberal democracies, as compared with two-thirds of smaller states and 
almost 80% of states with less than half a million population.
50 
By the beginning of 1997, the number of democracies in the world had increased to 118, and 
even though the number of independent states has steadily grown throughout the third wave 
(by more than a third), the proportion of countries that are formally democratic has more than 
doubled, to over 60 percent. More striking still is how much of this growth (both proportionally 
and in sheer number of democracies) has occurred in the 1990s, with the collapse of Soviet 
and East European communism and the diffusion of the third wave to sub-Saharan Africa. As 
Table 1 shows, the number and percentage of democracies in the world has increased every 
year since 1990. This can only be described as a democratic breakthrough without 
precedent in world history. As recently as 1990, when he was writing  The Third Wave, 
Huntington found only 45 percent of the world’s states (with populations over one million) to 
be democratic, a proportion virtually identical to that in 1922 at the peak of the first wave.
51  
Even if we similarly restrict our view to countries with populations over one million, the 
proportion of democracies in the world now stands at 57 percent. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
50  More precisely the proportions of countries rated “free” by freedom house for 1996 are: over one million 
population, 34.2%; under one million population 66.2%; and under 500,000 population, 78.8%. Unfortunately, space 
does not permit a systematic exploration of why this is so. Certainly, part of the relationship is probably an artifact of 
experience with British colonialism, which is more likely to have left behind democratic and legalistic traditions. 
Economic development may also account for some of the difference. However, as I argue elsewhere, I believe there 
is a real (inverse) relationship between size and democracy, and that very small countries do have certain 
advantages in making democracy work. For a classic exploration of this relationship, see Robert A. Dahl and 
Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973). 
51  Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 25–26. 22 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
Table 1: Number of Electoral Democracies, 1974, 1990–96 
Year  Number of 
Democracies 
Number of 
Countries 
Democracies 
 as % of all 
Countries 
Annual Rate of 
Increase in 
Democracies as 
% 
1974  39  142  27.5   
1990  76  165  46.1  n.a. 
1991  91  183  49.7  19.7 
1992  99  186  53.2   8.1 
1993  108  190  56.8   8.3 
1994  114  191  59.7   5.3 
1995  117  191  61.3   2.6 
1996  118  191  61.8   0.9 
Sources:  Data from Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties, 1990–91, 1991–92, 1992–93, 1993–94, 1994–95 (New York: Freedom House, 1991 and years following); 
and Freedom Review 27 (January–February 1996). 
 
Note: Figures for 1990–95 are for the end of the calendar year. Figures for 1974 reflect my estimate of the number 
of democracies in the world in April 1974, at the inception of the third wave. 
What has been the trend with respect to  liberal democracy? As one would expect, both the 
number of countries and the proportion of countries in the world rated “free” by Freedom 
House have also significantly increased, albeit not as dramatically. From the beginning of the 
Freedom House survey in 1972 until 1980, the number of free states increased by only ten 
(and the proportion of free states in the world rose only slightly, from 29 percent in 1972 to 
32 percent in 1980). Moreover, change was not only in one direction. During the first six 
years of the third wave (to 1980) five states suffered breakdowns or erosions of democracy 
that cost them their free status by the end of the decade. In fact, although the overall trend of 
regime change during the third wave has been toward significantly more democracy and 
freedom in the world, fully 22 countries suffered democratic breakdowns or recessions from 
the “free” status between 1974 and 1991, and  – as I will shortly indicate  – further 
deterioration and oscillation has occurred since then.
52 
In the latter half of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, freedom took its biggest jump 
during the third wave. As we see in Table 2, between 1985 and 1991 (a crucial time point, 
since it encompasses the demise of both East European and Soviet communism), the 
number of free states jumped from 56 to 76 and the proportion of free states in the world 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
52  Larry Diamond, “The Globalization of Democracy,” in Robert O. Slater, Barry R. Schutz, and Steven R. Dorr, 
eds., Global Transformation and the Third World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), Table 3.2, p. 41. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 23 
increased from a third to over 40 percent. Moreover, the proportion of blatantly authoritarian, 
“not free” states, declined to a historic low of 23 percent in 1991, falling further to just over 20 
percent in 1992. By contrast, in 1972 almost half the independent states in the world were 
rated “not free.” Average levels of freedom in the world also experienced their biggest 
improvement in the period from 1985 to 1991. Although the third wave had been under way 
for a decade, by 1985 the mean overall freedom score (averaging political rights and civil 
liberties) was no different than it had been in 1974  – 5.0. And the average overall freedom 
score was only slightly better (and virtually no different from the 1980 average). From 1985 
to 1991, the average overall freedom score improved by more than half a point on the seven-
point scale (Table 3). 
The 1991–1992 period appears to have been the high-water mark for freedom in the world. 
After 1991, the proportion of free states declined slightly, and even with the modest net 
increase of three free states during 1996, in proportional terms liberal democracies are no 
more common now than they were in 1991.
53 Moreover, since 1992, the proportion of “not 
free” states has jumped sharply, from 20 to almost 28 percent (Table 2). Gains in freedom 
have generally been offset by losses over the past five years. During 1993, 43 countries 
registered a deline in their freedom score, 18 a gain. In 1994, eight countries improved their 
freedom category (e.g., from partly free to free) and four declined in category, but overall, 
freedom scores increased in 22 countries while declining in 23.
54 During 1995, the trend was 
slightly more positive, with 29 increases in freedom scores and 11 declines. Yet the total 
number of free states did not change at all. With country gains in freedom outstripping 
setbacks in 1996 as well (31 to 13), 1996 might appear to signal the renewal of at least a 
modest expansionary trend for democracy. However, despite the continued  (slight) increase 
in the number of electoral democracies, the overall level of freedom in the world in 1996 was 
virtually identical to what it had been in 1992 (Table 3). The incremental gains in the overall 
average freedom score since 1993 suggests the possiblity of a renewed positive trend, but 
the total improvement has been slight (less than two-tenths of a point on the 7–point scale) 
and in all likelihood it will remain uneven and piecemeal  – far short of the dramatic 
proportions of a “wave.” 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
53  During 1996, five states crossed the threshold to “free” status – the Philippines, Taiwan, Romania, Bolivia, and 
Venezuela – while two slipped from it (Slovakia and Ecuador). The developments in Taiwan and Romania may be 
seen as especially significant since they marked the first time in history that either country had reached what could 
be termed liberal democracy. Freedom Review 28, no. 1 (January-February 1997), pp. 6–7. 
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Table 2: Freedom Status of Independent States, 1972–96 
Year  Free  %  Partly 
Free 
%  Not 
Free 
%  Total   % 
1972  42  29.0  36   24.8  67  46.2  145  100 
1980  52   31.9  52  31.9  59  36.2  163  100 
1985  56  33.5  56  33.5  55  32.9  16  100 
1990  65  39.4  50  30.3  50  30.3  165  100 
1991  76  41.5  65  35.5  42  22.9  183  100 
1992  75  40.3  73  39.2  38  20.4  186  100 
1993  72  37.9  63  33.2  55  28.9  190  100 
1994  76  39.8  61  31.9  54  28.3  191  100 
1995  76  39.8  62  32.5  53  27.7  191  100 
1996  79  41.4  59  31.1  53  27.7  191  100 
 
Sources:  For 1972, 1980, and 1985: Raymond D. Gastil, ed., Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties, 1988–89 (New York: Freedom House, 1989). For 1991–95: See Table 1. 
 
Note: Ratings refer to the status of the countries at the end of the calendar year. See text for an explanation of the 
basis of the ratings. 
 
Table 3: Trends in Overall Freedom Levels, 1974–1996 
Year  Number of 
Declining 
Freedom 
Scores 
Number of 
Improving 
Freedom 
Scores 
Median 
Freedom  
Score 
Average 
Freedom  
Score 
1974  16  16  5.0  4.47 
1980  24  25  5.0  4.26 
1985  12  9  5.0  4.29 
1990  18  36  4.0  3.84 
1991  17  41  3.5  3.68 
1992  31  39  3.5  3.61 
1993  43  18  3.5  3.72 
1994  23  22  3.5  3.69 
1995  11  29  3.5  3.63 
1996  13  31  3.5  3.58 
Sources: See Table 2. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 25 
Juxtaposing the two divergent trends of the 1990s  – continued growth in electoral 
democracy, but relative stasis in the incidence of liberal democracy – shows the increasing 
shallowness of democratization in the late period of the third wave. During the first six years 
of this decade, the gap between formal and liberal democracy in the world steadily widened 
(and then slightly narrowed in 1996). As a proportion of all the world’s democracies, free 
states declined from 85 percent in 1990 to 65 percent in 1995 and 67 percent in 1996. (Table 
4).  
Table 4: Formal and Liberal Democracies, 1990–96 
Year  Number 
of Formal 
Demo-
cracies of 
all states 
% of all 
states 
Number 
of Free 
States – 
Liberal 
Demo-
cracies 
% of all 
states  
Number 
of Free 
States as 
a % of 
Formal 
Democr. 
Total 
1990  76  46.1  65 39.4  85.5  165 
1991  91  49.7  76 41.5  83.5  183 
1992  99  53.2  75 40.3  75.8  186 
1993  108  56.8  72 37.9  66.7  190 
1994  114  59.7  76 39.8  66.7  191 
1995  117  61.3  76 39.8  65.0  191 
1996  118  61.8  79 41.4  67.0  191 
 
Sources: See Table 1. 
During this period, the quality of democracy (as measured by the levels of political rights and 
civil liberties) has eroded in a number of the most important and influential new democracies 
of the third wave  – Russia, Turkey, Brazil, and Pakistan  – while an expected transition to 
democracy in Africa’s most populous country, Nigeria imploded. At the same time, political 
freedom has deteriorated in several of the longest-surviving democracies in the developing 
world, including India, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and Venezuela, although it has begun to 
improve again in India and Venezuela. 
As Huntington has argued in the  The Third Wave, the demonstration effects that are so 
important in the wavelike diffusion or recession of democracy emanate disproportionately 
from the more powerful countries within a region, and internationally. Table  5 shows the 
trends in average freedom scores for the past decade (from 1986 to 1996) for twelve 
countries that are electoral democracies today and that could be considered the most 26 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
powerful countries (in population and gross national product) within their regions.
55 The 
overall picture conveys the mixed and contradictory nature of global democratic trends in 
recent years. In two of these twelve countries – South Korea and Poland  – freedom scores 
have been continuously good (“free”) since their transitions to democracy and have even 
improved in recent years (the trend is also positive in South Africa, but its democratic 
transition is too recent to draw many inferences yet). In each of the six countries that have 
been electoral democracies for all or most of the decade covered in the table, freedom levels 
have eroded. Most strikingly, India has gone from a longtime status of free to partly free.
56 
Pakistan has declined, since its democratic transition in 1988, from nearly free to the edge of 
political chaos, with massive political corruption and heavy-handed presidential intervention 
forcing out one elected government after another. Brazil and the Philippines experienced 
deterioration in civil liberties that has put them just below the free category, although both 
then improved their freedom scores (with the Philippines rejoining the “free” category). 
Argentina remains free (with significant progress on economic reform), but its freedom 
scores have been edging steadily downward since 1990, which is about the time t hat a 
president with less apparent commitment to democratic procedures, Carlos Menem, 
succeeded Raul Alfonsin. Thailand has oscillated quite a bit due to military intervention, overt 
and more subtle, and only in 1996, as military influence continued to ebb, did it recover the 
nearly free rating it had held in the late 1980s. Turkey’s deterioration has been most striking 
of all, declining sharply since 1993 from the nearly free average score (3) it held for six 
years, reflecting growing military influence and what have been described as “widespread” 
and “appalling” human rights abuses.
57 Finally, in the more recent (and unstable) electoral 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
55  Table 5 also includes Nigeria as a kind of parenthetical reference, because it appeared, for so much of this 
period to be moving toward democracy, and had constructed most of the architecture of electoral democracy until 
1993, when the military annulled the results of a free and fair presidential election and then ultimately scrapped the 
whole emergent electoral system in a November coup. The drastic reduction in freedom in Nigeria since the June 
1993 election annulment underscores my point about the significant recessionary trends of freedom in the world in 
recent years. And the demonstration effects of military rule in Nigeria should not be dismissed. They may well have 
contributed to the military overthrows of electoral democracy in Gambia in 1995 (where Nigeria had military advisors 
stationed) and in Niger (Nigeria’s principal northern neighbor) in January 1996. The poignancy and needlessness of 
Nigeria’s political tragedy emerges in particularly sharp relief when its trend in freedom scores is compared with 
South Africa’s. From the late 1980s, both of these countries began to experience a controlled political 
decompression, and their freedom scores improved step-wise in remarkably parallel fashion – until 1993, when the 
Nigerian military aborted democracy while the South African regime was preparing to inaugurate it. 
56   It must be conceded that Freedom House has become more sensitive in its scoring in recent years, and in the 
1990s its ratings appear to reflect a greater tendency to downgrade freedom scores in electoral democracies for 
problems of human rights abuses, electoral violence, military influence, and generally poor and corrupt functioning 
of democratic institutions. The freedom score for India (4), which is no better than for nondemocratic Mexico, 
Jordan, and Ghana in 1995, strikes many observers (including myself) as particularly questionable and perhaps 
harsh in its underappreciation of the extent of electoral competitiveness and the vibrancy of Indian civil society. 
Nevertheless, I believe the overall implication of these scores, that levels of civil and political freedom have 
diminished since the mid-1980s in many prominent electoral democracies, is valid, and supported by other evidence 
and analysis (including the rising incidence of religious and secessionist violence and repressive state responses). 
57  Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 1994–1995, p. 567; Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World 
Report 1994 (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1993), p. 243. See also the State Department’s Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 , which frankly notes the persistence of torture and excessive use of 
force, despite the close security and economic ties between the U.S. and Turkey. The Human Rights Watch World 
Report 1996 (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1995) indicates some improvement in Turkey’s human I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 27 
democracies of Russia and Ukraine, freedom scores have declined slightly since the 
transition. The relative success of Russia’s 1996 presidential elections was an important step 
toward institutionalizing electoral competition, but it may also be seen as more of an aversion 
of political disaster than a decisive gain for political freedom (as Russia’s freedom score 
registered no change). 
Table 5: Average Freedom Scores, 1986–1996 / 12 Influential Electoral Democracies 
     1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
India  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  3.5  3.5  4  4  4  3 
Pakistan  4.5  4.5  3 T  3  4  4.5  4.5ﬂ  4  4  4ﬂ  4.5 
Brazil  2  2  2.5  2  2.5  2.5ﬂ  2.5  3.5  3  3  3 
Argentina  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  2  2  2.5  2.5ﬂ  2.5  2.5ﬂ  2.5 
Turkey  3.5  3  3  3  3  3  3  4  5  5  4.5 
Philippines  3 T  2  2.5  2.5ﬂ  3  3  3  3.5  3.5  3  2.5 
South 
Korea 
4.5  4  2.5 T  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2  2  2  2 
Thailand  3  3  3  2.5›  2.5  5  3.5  4  4  3.5  3 
Russia ￿  7  6.5  5.5  5.5›  4.5  3 T  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Ukraine ￿  7  6.5  5.5  5.5›  4.5  3 T  3  4  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Poland  5.5  5  5  3.5  2 T  2  2  2  2  1.5  1.5 
South Africa  5.5  5.5  5.5  5.5›  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  2.5 T  1.5  1.5 
(Failed Transition) 
(Nigeria)  6  5.5  5  5.5  5  4.5  4.5  6  6.5  7  6.5 
 
T – Indicates year of transition to electoral democracy 
￿ – Scores are for USSR until 1991 
›ﬂ – Denotes an upward or downward trend in the level of freedom, but without a change in score 
                                                                                                                                          
rights situation in 1995, including the amendment of a repressive law, the release of scores of political prisoners, 
and some reduction in killings by “death squads,” due largely to international and especially European pressure. 
However, there persisted a pattern of abuse much more characteristic of authoritarian regimes than of even 
minimal, electoral democracies. “Free expression was still punished with arrests and imprisonment, torture was still 
employed as a routine instrument of police investigation, an abusive counterinsurgency campaign continued to 
empty Kurdish villages, and there were continued reports of disappearances” (p. 239).  Both the radical separatist 
Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK, and Turkey’s state security forces have been responsible for extensive violence 
against innocent civilians in violation of international law. Human Rights Watch estimates that the civil war in 
Southeastern Turkey has claimed “over 19,000 deaths, including some 2,000 death-squad killings of suspected PKK 
sympathizers, two million displaced, and more than 2,200 villages destroyed, most of which were burned down by  
Turkish security forces.” Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War 
in Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, November 1995), p. 1. 28 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
This undertow in the third wave has been particularly s ignificant (if not more widely 
acknowledged) within Latin America. Of the 22 countries below the Rio Grande with 
populations over one million, ten have substantively lower freedom scores in 1996 than they 
did in 1987, while eight have improved their scores.
58 During this decade, five countries 
made transitions to formal democracy (Chile, Nicaragua, Haiti, Panama, and Paraguay), but 
only Chile and (more recently) Panama moved to “free” status. Seven countries fell out of the 
“free” status because of substantive deterioration in democratic conditions, although Bolivia 
and Venezuela moved back above the free threshold in 1996. Even in some currently free 
states (such as Argentina, Jamaica, and Venezuela) the overall freedom trend in recent 
years has been negative. Although it is commonly assumed that Latin America today is 
overwhelmingly democratic, only nine of the 22 principal countries in the region were rated 
as free at the end of 1996, compared with thirteen in 1987 (see Table 6).
59 While harsh and 
blatant authoritarian rule has receded in the hemisphere, so has liberal democracy, as the 
region has experienced a regression toward the mean, a “convergence” toward “more mixed 
kinds of semi-democratic regimes.”
60 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
58  Again, it is difficult to compare scores within countries across this span of time because the standards of the 
freedom survey have risen somewhat in this period. Nevertheless, I am discounting here the declines of Costa Rica 
from an average score of 1.5 to 2 and of Honduras from 2.5 to 3 (which were explicitly identified by Freedom House 
as methodological changes); the decline of Guatemala from 3 to 3.5, since the latter score for 1996 denotes a 
marked improvement from recent years (and probably from what prevailed in 1987); and the decline of Cuba from 6 
to 7, which would also seem to involve a shift in rating standards.  
59  This perspective on the troubled and partly illusory state of democracy in Latin America is assessed extensively 
in Larry Diamond, “Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusion, and Directions for Consolidation,” in Tom Farer, 
ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), pp. 52–104. This assessment closely accords with that of Freedom House’s resident Latin 
Americanist, Douglas W. Payne, who warned in his 1995 annual survey, “Democracy is in the balance in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, but you would hardly know that from listening to the region’s political leaders.” “Latin 
America: Ballots, Neo-Strongmen, Narcos, and Impunity,” in Freedom in the World, 1994–1995, p. 17. 
60  Jonathan Hartlyn, “Democracies in Contemporary South America: Convergences and Diversities,” in Joseph 
Tulchin, ed., Argentina: The Challenges of Modernization (forthcoming), p. 14 of November 1995 draft mansucript. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 29 
Table 6: Democratic Status of Latin American Countries, 1987 and 1996 
Countries & Freedom Scores (Political Rights, Civil Liberties)  
Regime Type and Combined        1987 
Freedom Score 
1996 
Liberal Democracies     
Freedom Score 2  Costa Rica (1,1)   
  Trinidad & Tobago (1,1) ￿   
Freedom Score, 3–4  Argentina (2,1)  Costa Rica (1,2)# 
  Uruguay (2,2)  Trinidad & Tobago (1,2) ￿ 
  Jamaica (2,2) ￿  Uruguay (1,2) ￿ 
  Dom Republic (1,3)  Chile (2,2) 
  Brazil (2,2)   
  Venezuela (1,2)   
Freedom Score 5  Bolivia (2,3)  Argentina (2,3) 
  Colombia (2,3)  Bolivia (2,3) ￿ 
  Ecuador (2,3)  Jamaica (2,3) ￿ 
  Honduras (2,3)  Panama (2,3) ￿ 
  Peru (2,3)  Venezuela (2,3) ￿ 
Electoral Democracies (and pseudodemocracies) 
Freedom Score, 6  Guatemala (3,3)  Brazil (2,4) ￿ 
    Dom Republic (3,3) ￿ 
    Ecuador (2,4) ￿ 
    El Salvador (3,3) 
    Honduras (3,3)# 
    Nicaragua (3,3) ￿ 
Freedom Score, 7  El Salvador (3,4)  Guatemala (3,4) ￿ 
    Mexico (4,3) ￿ 
    Paraguay (4,3) ￿ 
    Peru (4,3) ￿ 
Freedom Score, 8–9  Mexico (4,4)  Colombia (4,4) ￿ 
    Haiti (4,5) ￿ 
Authoritarian     
Freedom Score, 10–11  Chile (6,5)   
  Haiti (5,6) ￿   
  Nicaragua (5,5) ￿   
  Panama (5,5) ￿   
  Paraguay (5,6)   
Freedom score 12–14  Cuba (6,6)  Cuba (7,7) 
Note: Excludes countries with less than 1 million population. Figures in parantheses are the Freedom House country 
scores (political rights and civil liberties, respectively). Each scale ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 being most free.  # 
indicates rating was changed for purely methodological reasons.  signifies the most recent trend of a shift downward 
and  a shift upward in the freedom score in the previous three years.  signifies a downward trend in the level of 30 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
democracy, but not significant enough to have changed the freedom rating. These symbols apply to the last year of 
change in the period 1993–1995. Sources: Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1987–88 (New 
York: Freedom House, 1988) and Freedom Review, Jan-Feb 1995, 1996, 1997. 
 
Some consider it remarkable that Latin American democracies have survived at all under the 
enormous stresses Latin American democracies have suffered over the past decade  – 
dramatic economic downturns and increases in poverty (only recently being reversed in 
some countries), the mushrooming drug trade, and the violence and corruption that flourish 
in its wake. Since the redemocratization o f Latin America began in the early 1980s, the 
response to severe adversity and political crisis  – including scandals that have forced 
presidential resignations in several countries  – has primarily been adherence to 
constitutional process and electoral alternation in office (although the military did nearly 
overthrow democracy in Venezuela in 1992, and has rattled its sabres loudly elsewhere, as 
in Paraguay in 1996).
61 In the practice of “voting the bums out” rather than mobilizing against 
democracy itself, L atin American publics have given many observers cause to discern a 
normalization and maturation of democratic politics unlike previous eras.
62  Indeed, a number 
of democratic governments (in Southern and Eastern Europe as well as Latin America) have 
been able to make some considerable progress in economic reform during the third wave, 
and in one sizeable sample of such reform experiences, “the party that initiated cuts in 
working-class income has been defeated in less than half the cases.”
63 This resilience a nd 
persistence of constitutional procedures is cause for hope about the future of democracy in 
Latin America. So are recent reforms which have decentralized power and opened up the 
electoral process in Venezuela and Colombia, instituted an independent electoral 
commission in Panama, and improved judicial functioning in several countries. But these 
positive signs and steps have been counterbalanced and in many countries outweighed by 
conditions that render electoral democracy in the region increasingly hollow, illiberal, 
delegative, and afflicted. These trends, evident in the growth of authoritarian practices under 
elected civilian presidents in countries such as Peru and Venezuela, the persistence of 
human rights violations and judicial inefficacy, and the explosion of corruption and erosion of 
the rule of law under pressure from the drug trade, highlight the yawning gap between formal 
and liberal democracy. Even with their rather different political orientations, Human Rights 
Watch and Freedom House thus come to remarkably similar conclusions:  
  Periodic elections and transfers of power have not automatically led to an improvement 
in the quality of democracy experienced on a daily basis by the majority of citizens. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
61  On “The Coup That Didn’t Happen” in Paraguay, see the article of that title by Arturo Valenzuela, Journal of 
Democracy 8, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 43–55. 
62  See in particular Karen L. Remmer, “Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience,” World 
Politics “42, no. 3 (April 1990): 315–335; “The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America,” American 
Political Science Review 85 (1991), pp. 777–800, and “Democratization in Latin America,” in Robert O. Slater, Barry 
M. Schutz, and Steven R. Dorr, eds., Global Transformation and the Third World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1993), pp. 91–111. 
63  Barbara Geddes, “Challenging the Conventional Wisdom,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., 
Economic Reform and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) p. 67. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 31 
Impunity for serious human rights violations committed by state agents is still 
appallingly pervasive; for the most part, military and police forces are accountable to 
courts and to civilian authorities on paper only. The courts fail miserably in providing 
citizens with a fair and impartial forum for the resolution of private disputes, and even 
more miserably in protecting them from abuse at the hands of the state, or in 
redressing those abuses.
64 
  The reality is that in the region today, rule is still based more on power than on law.... In 
a majority of countries the traditionally dominant sectors of society – political elites, the 
wealthy, armies, police  – continue to enrich themselves at public expense, while the 
human rights of ordinary people are violated with impunity. Judicial systems are less 
about justice than providing protection for those who can pay for it and punishing those 
who cannot. Voters can chase presidents and legislators through the ballot box in most 
countries, but government remains a racket dominated by the powerful and the well-
connected.
65 
As I have already suggested, the trends of increasing (or persisting) disorder, human rights 
violations, legislative and judicial inefficacy, corruption, and military impunity and 
prerogatives have been evident in other third wave democracies around the world, not only 
major countries like Turkey and Pakistan but smaller ones such as Albania, Zambia and 
most of the electoral regimes of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, as one moves toward the 
former Soviet Union, Africa, parts of Asia, and the Middle East, elections themselves are 
increasingly hollow and uncompetitive, a thin disguise for the authoritarian hegemony of 
despots and ruling parties. “As recognition grows of the right freely to elect one’s 
governmental representatives, more governments [feel] compelled to hold elections in order 
to gain [international] legitimacy.”
66 However, in 1995 alone, these contests descended into 
“an electoral charade” in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (not 
to mention Iraq, Iran, Egypt, and Algeria) because of intimidation, rigging, and constriction (or 
in the extreme, utter obliteration) of the right of opposition forces to organize and contest.
67 
Since the recent wave of democratization began its sweep through Africa in early 1991, 
sixteen (formally) civilian regimes have held multiparty elections so flawed that they do not 
meet the minimal criteria for electoral democracy. In 1996 alone, fraud and intimidation 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
64.  Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 
1992), p. 69. Although this assessment is now three years old, the 1996 Report of Human Rights Watch indicates 
that change has been marginal at best. “More than a decade of civilian rule has allowed for a blossoming of civil 
society, yet the limits of political space were still defined by torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions in 
1995.” Such repressive practices still remained to be criminalized by the penal codes of most countries. Judiciaries 
remained timid at best in guaranteeing due process and individual rights, and routinely accepted confessions 
obtained through torture. Military justice systems “continued to foster a climate of impunity for perpetrators of human 
rights.” Human Rights Watch World Report 1996, p. 63. 
65  Payne, “Latin America,” in Freedom in the World 1994–1995, p. 17. 
66  Human Rights Watch World Report 1996, p. xxv. 
67  Ibid. 32 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
negated the promise of electoral democracy in eleven of these countries, including Zambia, 
which lost its democratic status as a result.
68 
We thus have two degrees of gap, between liberal democracy and electoral democracy, and 
more radically, between liberal democracy and its pale (and in many countries barely 
discernible) shadow of pseudodemocracy. Perhaps the most stunning feature of the third 
wave of democratization is how few regimes are left in the world (less than 20 percent) that 
do not fit into one of these three categories of civilian, multiparty, electoral regimes.
69  This 
growing contradiction  – continued expansion of the form of electoral democracy (and even 
more widely, of multiparty elections) while levels of actual freedom within such regimes 
diminish  – signals the ideological hegemony of “democracy” in the post-Cold War world 
system, but also the superficial nature of that hegemony. In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the United States, and the international community more broadly, demand real 
electoral democracy, but are not too fussy about human rights and the rule of law. For Africa, 
a lower standard is set by the major Western powers: opposition parties that can contest for 
office, even if they are to be manipulated, hounded, and blatantly rigged into defeat at 
election time. 
As the pace of democratic diffusion has quickened in recent years, we should perhaps not 
be surprised that the gap between democratic form and substance in the world has widened. 
The wealthy, established democracies, and the international institutions they dominate, 
expect other countries to have or move toward democratic institutions, but seem willing to 
accept a low standard of empirical adherence to democratic principles. Thus, an excessive 
emphasis is placed on “free and fair elections” as the key standard for democracy (or for 
Africa, simply “multipartyism”), and interest in democratic conditionality wanes after that 
electoral hurdle has been scaled. But even when chicanery is prevented on election day, 
how free, fair, and meaningful can elections be when the civil liberties of individuals and 
associations are routinely violated; when the legislatures that are elected have little or no 
power over public policy; when state power remains heavily centralized and people have 
virtually no control over policy and resources at the local level; when the judiciary is corrupt, 
ineffective, and unable to provide a rule of law; and when elites who are not accountable to 
any elected authority  – the military, the bureaucracy, local political bosses  – exercise 
substantial veto power or direct control over public policy? In these circumstances, elections 
– however much they freely and accurately reflect the preferences between given options of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
68  The countries are Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana (in 1992 but not 1996), Togo, Cameroon, 
Gabon, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ethiopia, Chad, Equitorial Guinea, Gambia, Mauritania, Niger, and Zambia.  Particularly 
significant has been the recent trend toward subversion of the electoral process (in Chad, the Gambia, Niger, and 
prospectively Nigeria soon) “to clothe army coup-makers in civilian legitimacy that places little restraint on 
repressive rule.” Thomas R. Lasner, “Africa: Between Failure and Opportunity,” Freedom Review 28, no. 1 (January-
February 1997): 133. 
69  Although regimes can be difficult to classify (in the thinness of their tolerance for political opposition), I calculate 
that only about 35 regimes in the world did not (as of April 1997) allow at least one or more opposition parties to 
contest elections, at least superficially. This is only about 18 percent of the world’s regimes. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 33 
those who turn out to vote on election day – cannot in themselves signal the presence of 
liberal democracy. 
4. Is The Third Wave Over? 
With the proportion of liberal democracies in the world now stagnating; with many third wave 
democracies deteriorating in their actual democratic performance; with human rights abuses 
persistent and even increasing in recent years in a number of less developed democracies; 
with the gap between the electoral form and liberal substance of democracy growing; with 
the percent of the world’s population living in free states having actually delined sharply over 
the past decade (due largely to India’s democratic recession, to be sure); and with the 
world’s most populous, powerful, and influential authoritarian states – China, Indonesia, Iran, 
and Saudi Arabia – showing little or no prospect of democratization in the next few years, the 
question arises: Is the third wave over? 
In two senses, the evidence in the affirmative appears to be mounting. As Table 1 shows, the 
rate of increase in the number of electoral democracies in the world has steadily declined 
each year since 1991 in asymptotic fashion, to the point where it is now near zero. While 
some countries  – such as Mexico and Jordan  – might complete incremental and fitful 
transitions to electoral democracy in the next few years, or return to democratic status (such 
as Peru), or make a more rapid democratic breakthrough (such as Yugoslavia or Zimbabwe), 
there is not an obvious cluster of candidates to continue to feed a “wave” of transitions. Of 
course, in 1987 (or even 1988) few foresaw the imminent regional waves of democratization 
that were about to sweep through Central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. But 
precisely because electoral democracy has spread rapidly to a majority of the world’s states, 
many of these new regimes are highly fragile, and most of the remaining nondemocracies 
have objective conditions that do not augur well for imminent transitions. Instead, it is more 
likely that in the next five years democratic regressions (as in Zambia) or breakdowns (as in 
Niger and Gambia) will largely offset new breakthroughs to electoral democracy, and that 
some few transitions to democracy will be aborted (as in Nigeria) or otherwise largely 
drained of democratic content (as has happened through political violence, repression and 
fraud in Cambodia and many of the former Soviet states). In short, the unprecedented 
expansion in electoral democracy appears to be drawing to a halt, and new regime 
concessions to the global expectation of “democracy” seem likely to take the most hollow 
and ritualistic forms of some type and degree of pseudodemocracy. 
If we look even more demandingly beyond the form of democracy  – a form that is 
increasingly expected by world culture and organizations – we see erosion and stagnation 
offsetting liberalization and consolidation. Liberal democracy  – and political freedom more 
generally – have also levelled off within a narrow range of variation in recent years. While it 34 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
is too early to assess whether the slight upward trend of the last three years will be 
sustained, oscillation along the border between the “free” and “partly free” categories seems 
more likely than a steady increase in the number of free states. Over the past decade at 
least twelve democracies that had attained a “free” rating slipped below that threshold at 
least temporarily.
70 Of the third-wave democracies from the postcommunist and developing 
worlds (with populations over one million) that are “free” in 1996, about half (ten of the 22) 
are clustered in the lowest rating (2.5) of the free category (see Appendix). (Another 14 
states are just below the  threshold at 3.0). If we take the liberal content of democracy 
seriously, we must pay close attention to what happens to these and other volatile electoral 
democracies.  
When overall expansion in the number of democracies and the overall level of 
democraticness in the world halts for a sustained period (say, five to ten years), it seems 
reasonable to conclude that a democratic wave has come to an end. At least, this marks the 
end of a “short wave” of democratization. The second wave of democratization lasted about 
two decades. The third wave appears to have lasted not much longer. 
Does this mean that a third reverse wave of democracy is inevitably approaching? This more 
dramatic change is not yet apparent and may well be avoidable. It is theoretically possible for 
a wave of democratic expansion to be followed not by a reverse wave but by a period of 
stagnation or stability, in which the number of democracies in the world overall neither 
increases or decreases significantly for some time, and in which gains for democracy are 
more or less offset by losses. It is precisely such a period of stasis we seem to have entered.  
Many of the new democracies of the third wave are in serious trouble today, and there are 
grounds for arguing that the erosion of democratic substance could be a precursor to the 
actual suspension or overthrow of democracy, whether by executive or military coup. 
President Alberto Fujimori’s  autogolpe was  preceded by years of steady derioration in 
political rights and civil liberties. Historically, the path to military coups and other forms of 
democratic breakdown has been paved with the accumulation of unsolvable problems, the 
gross corruption and malfunctioning of democratic institutions, the gradual aggrandizement 
of executive power, and the broad popular disaffection with politics and politicians that are 
evident today in many third wave democracies (and a few of longer standing). 
However, three things are different today, and have so far have prevented a new wave of 
democratic breakdowns: 
1.  Military establishments are acutely reluctant to seize power overtly, because of the lack 
of popular support for a coup (due in part to the discredit many militaries suffered 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
70  These were India, the Philippines, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, 
Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, the Gambia. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 35 
during their previous brutal and inept rule); because of their sharply diminished 
confidence in their ability to tackle formidable economic and social problems; because 
of the “disastrous effects on the coherence, efficiency, and discipline of the army” 
which they have perceived during previous periods of military rule;
71 and, not least, 
because of the instant and powerful sanctions that the established democracies have 
shown an increasing resolve to impose against such democratic overthrows.
72 Thus, 
even where “the government cannot maintain civil order” and has been returned to 
power with such a low turnout, and with such “widespread vote-rigging, that its 
legitimacy is in doubt,” as in Bangladesh this past Feburary 15, the disgusted citizenry 
does not seem to want a coup, and the military surprises many observers by failing to 
seize power.
73   In addition, many of the democracies of the third wave have made 
significant progress toward establishing the conditions of “objective civilian control” that 
prevail in the industrialized democracies: high levels of military professionalism, 
constrained military role conceptions, subordination of the military to civilian decision 
makers, autonomy for the military in its limited area of professional competence, and 
thus “the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in 
the military.”
74 (In the more fragmented and illiberal postcommunist states, different 
dynamics also appear to have inhibited military coups).
75 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
71  Samuel P. Huntington, “Armed Forces and Democracy: Reforming Civil-Military Relations,”  Journal of 
Democracy 6, no. 4 (October 1995), p. 13. 
72  It is always hard to explain non-events – coups that did not happen. However, Valenzuela’s account of 
Paraguay’s 1996 crisis is particularly significant for its documentation of the international diplomatic mobilization 
against the looming threat of military intervention. The threat of international sanctions, inherent in the prevailing 
international climate and the resolutions of bodies like the EU and the OAS, and explicitly conveyed through 
messages from individual democracies like the U.S. and communities like the above two, appear to have played a 
role in deterring military intervention in Guatemala in 1993 and in Turkey since the coming to power of an Islamic-led 
government in July 1 996. Unfortunately, the inhibitions against renewed military intervention appear to be 
considerably weaker in Africa than in other regions, because most African militaries have far less corporate 
professionalism and sense of mission, and are riven with ethnic, factional and personalistic divisions and 
motivations. And to repeat, the persistence of military rule in Nigeria, in the face of rhetorically strident but effectively 
mild international pressure, appears to have had its own demonstration effects, encouraging militaries in West Africa 
in particular to seize power (as in Gambia and Niger). 
73  “Bangladesh’s Reluctant Army,” The Economist, February 24, 1996, pp. 35–36. 
74  Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” pp. 9–12. I do not think the trends in civil-military relations in 
third wave (or pre-existing Third World) democracies are as broadly encouraging as Huntington portrays them, 
however. Undeniable progress in a number of cases, such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Poland, is 
counterbalanced by stagnation or regression in some others, as discussed below. In particular, as Jonathan Hartlyn 
observes, the state of civil-military relations in Latin America “remains decidedly mixed for the fundamental reason 
that it is not obvious what an appropriate role for [the military] should be that would facilitae their removal from active 
involvement in domestic politics.” Hartlyn, “Democracies in Contemporary South America,” p. 17. Like many other 
students of Latin America, Hartlyn believes that the militarization of the drug war (supported by the U.S.) has 
impeded the transition to a more democratically responsible and professionally constrained military. 
75  The absence of military regimes in the postcommunist states of the former Soviet Union and the former 
Yugoslavia – where state authority is weak and fragmented and civilian, multiparty regimes take the form of 
pseudodemocracy (or a very illiberal electoral democracy) – may owe to the radically antipolitical atmosphere, “the 
near total flight from the public world as such.” This, Charles Fairbanks speculates, produces leaders of militias and 
irregular armies “driven by the desire for money or raw power or by pointless grudges rather than by the ambition 
that builds states.” (“The Postcommunist Wars,” pp. 28 and 30). In Russia, a major reason why the military has not 
seized power, in Huntington’s view, is that it is no longer capable of doing so, given the dramatic declines in its 36 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
2.  Even where, as in Turkey, the Philippines, Brazil, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, progress 
toward democratic consolidation has been partial and slow, and the quality of 
democracy has deteriorated in some respects, publics have shown no appetite for a 
return to authoritarian rule of any kind; culturally, democracy remains a valued goal.
76 
3.  Finally, and related to the above,  no antidemocratic ideology with global appeal has 
emerged to challenge the continued global ideological hegemony of democracy as a 
principle and formal structure of government. 
As a result, political, social, and economic stresses that induced the breakdown of 
democracy during the first and second reverse waves have brought its diminution during the 
waning years of the third wave. Instead of expiring altogether, democracy has gradually been 
“hollowed out” in many countries, leaving a shell of multiparty electoralism, often with 
genuine competitiveness and uncertainty over outcomes, adequate to obtain international 
legitimacy and rewards (such as Turkey’s admission to the European Customs Union, 
French military and economic assistance to authoritarian rulers in its former African colonies, 
and continued U.S. security assistance to many illiberal Latin American regimes). Rather 
than topple or mobilize against the constitutional system, political leaders and groups that 
have no use for democracy, or are what Juan Linz calls, in his classic study of democratic 
breakdowns, “semiloyal” to the system, are more likely to choose and condone oblique and 
partial assaults on democracy, such as repressing particularly troublesome oppositions and 
minorities. Instead of seizing power through a coup, the military may gradually reclaim more 
operational autonomy and control over matters of internal security and anti-insurgency, as 
they have done in Colombia, Pakistan, Turkey, and to some degree India and Sri Lanka (as 
well as Guatemala and Nicaragua for a considerable period).
77 Or they may 
                                                                                                                                          
coherence, organization, professionalism, and morale since the break-up of the Soviet Union. (“Reforming Civil-
Military Relations,” p. 14).  
76  Observers may discern contrary trends in the resounding reelection, in April 1995, of the personalistic, 
autocratic President Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and in the strong showing of communists and extreme nationalists in 
Russia’s December 1995 parliamentary elections. However, even with all the advantages of his emergency 
authoritarian control, Fujimori barely won the October 1993 constitutional referendum greatly strengthening and 
centralizing executive power, and his margin of reelection victory was greatly aided by “preelection machinations” 
and fragmentation among opposition forces. (David Scott Palmer, “‘Fujipopulism’ and Peru’s Progress,” Current 
History 95, no. 598 (February 1996), pp. 70–75). As for Russia, close analysis of the parliamentary voting for both 
the party lists and the single-mandate seats suggests that the overall balance in the electorate between pro-reform 
and reactionary (communist or nationalist) forces may not have shifted much; or at least that voters are beginning to 
vote their “interests” and do not appear to be searching for “a man on a white horse.” For these interpretations, 
respectively, see the articles by Michael McFaul and Steven Fish in the April 1996 Journal of Democracy, 
forthcoming. Nevertheless, Russia appears to be the major third wave democracy most likely to fall soon even from 
the minimal standards of electoral democracy, given the likelihood of either a communist victory (and subsequent 
crackdown on opposition forces) or massive rigging by the pro-Yeltsin state forces in the June 1996 presidential 
elections. 
77  For a trenchant analysis linking Colombia’s democratic regression to murderous violence, wholesale impunity 
of state security forces for human rights abuses, and “a reassertion of military authority and autonomy,” despite a 
succession of sophisticated reformist presidents, see Marc W. Chernick, “Colombia’s Fault Lines,” Current History 
95, no. 598 (February 1996), pp. 76–81. With the military’s open defiance in 1995 of an agreement between the I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 37 
“constitutionalize” their rule through the facade of rigged elections  – as they have done in 
Niger, the Gambia, and Chad. Instead of terminating multiparty electoral competition and 
declaring a one-party (or no-party) dictatorship as they did during the first and second 
reverse waves, frustrated chief executives (like Alberto Fujimori in Peru) will temporarily 
suspend the constitution, dismiss and reorganize the legislature, and reshape to their 
advantage a constitutional system that will subsequently retain the formal structure or 
appearance of democracy. Or they will engage in a cat-and-mouse game with international 
donors, liberalizing politically in response to pressure and repressing as much as they 
believe they need to and can get away with in order to hang on to power  – as the former 
one-party regimes of Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, Omar Bongo in Gabon, and Paul Biya in 
Cameroon have done in Africa.  
5. The Imperative of Consolidation 
If the h istorical pattern is to be defied and a third reverse wave avoided, the overriding 
imperative in the coming years is to consolidate those democracies that have come into 
being during the Third Wave. In essence, consolidation is the process of achieving broad 
and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass 
levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, 
better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine.
78 As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, 
along with others, have stressed, this legitimacy must be more than a commitment to 
democracy in the abstract; it must also involve a shared normative and behavioral 
commitment to the specific rules and practices of the country’s constitutional system – what 
                                                                                                                                          
government and a guerilla force to demilitarize a particular area, and of a recommendation to retire a top general 
found guilty of a political murder, “it seemed that 10 years of carefully establishing an institutional framework for 
civilian control over the military had collapsed like a house of cards.” (p. 80). 
78  Three widely influential definitions of legitimacy along these lines are found in Lipset, Political Man , p. 64 , 
Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes , pp. 16–18, and Dahl, Polyarchy , pp. 129–131. One value to this 
conceptual approach is that it enables us to apply the notion of consolidation, and its relationship to regime 
persistence and stability, to nondemocratic (or semi-democratic) as well as democratic regimes. Although the 
contribution of legitimacy to regime persistence becomes murkier in non-democratic regimes, precisely because 
they rely much more extensively than democracies on coercion and intimidation rather than voluntary compliance, 
we are at risk of sloppy and normatively biased thinking if we assume that nondemocratic regimes cannot 
development substantial legitimacy, and bases of persistence that rely more heavily on consent than coercion. 
Thus, we can speak of the consolidation of nondemocratic, pseudodemocratic, and partially democratic regimes, as 
in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mexico, and we can also speak of their deconsolidation, when their 
legitimacy becomes contested and strained, hopefully paving the way (as in Mexico) to a democratic transition. For 
elaboration of this broader conception of legitimacy, and application to the (mainly less-than-democratic) regimes of 
Southeast Asia, see Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). Because democratic institutions have greater capacity for adaptation 
and self-correction, and are less dependent for their legitimation on personalities and immediate economic 
performance, I believe that democracies are capable of more enduring legitimation than nondemocracies, and 
hence of managing political strains and institutional crises without experiencing deconsolidation. But this by no 
means guarantees that any particular democracy will achieve such lasting legitimation/consolidation, and the 
hypothesis raises a host of issues beyond the scope of this analysis. 38 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
Linz earlier called “loyalty” to the democratic regime.
79 At the elite level, all significant political 
competitors or potential competitors (not only parties but interest groups and movements) 
must come to regard democracy – and the laws, procedures, and institutions it specifies – as 
“the only game in town,” the only viable framework for governing the society and advancing 
their own interests. At the mass level, there must be a broad normative and behavioral 
consensus – cutting across class, ethnic, nationality, and other cleavages – on the legitimacy 
of the constitutional system, however poor or unsatisfying its performance may be at any 
point in time.
80 It is the deep, unquestioned, routinized commitment to democracy and  its 
procedures at the elite and mass levels that produces a crucial element of consolidation, a 
reduction in the uncertainty of democracy, regarding not so much the outcomes as the rules 
and methods of political competition. As consolidation advances, “there is a widening of the 
range of political actors who come to assume democratic conduct [and democratic loyalty] 
on the part of their adversaries,” a transition from “instrumental” to “principled” commitments 
to the democratic framework, a growth in trust and cooperation among political competitors, 
and a socialization of the general population (through both deliberate efforts and the practice 
of democracy in politics and civil society).
81 Although many contemporary theorists are 
strangely determined to avoid the term, I believe that these elements of the consolidation 
process can only be fully understood as encompassing a shift in political culture.
82  
Consolidation involves not just agreement on the rules for competing for power, but 
fundamental and self-enforcing restraints on the exercise of power. This, in turn, requires a 
mutual commitment among elites, through the “coordinating” mechanism of a constitution, 
related political institutions, and often an elite pact or settlement as well, to enforce limits on 
state authority, no matter which party or faction may control the state at any given time. Only 
when this commitment is powerfully credible, because it is broadly shared among key 
alternative power groups, does a ruling party, president, or “sovereign” d evelop a clear self-
interest in adhering to the rules of the game, which then makes those constitutional rules 
“self-enforcing.” This in turn involves not just tactical calculations but again, a normative shift 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
79  Linz, “The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes,” pp. 16, 29–31, 36–37. 
80  Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming), chapter 2, and 
“Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (April 1996): 14–33. For other 
conceptualizations of consolidation that are similar to or at least not inconsisent with this emphasis, see for example 
Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, pp. 26–34; and Richard Gunther, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, and P. Nikiforos 
Diamandouros, “Introduction,” in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds., The Politics of Democratic 
Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 
7–10. 
81  Whitehead, “The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies,” p. 79; on the contributions of civil society in this 
process, see Diamond, “Toward Democratic Consolidation.” In a seminal formulation, Danwart Rustow has given the 
name “habituation” to this process, in which contingent and instrumental elite commitments to democracy become 
rooted in values and beliefs at both the elite and mass levels, through the continuous, successful practice of 
democracy. “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970), p. 357. 
82  See the essays in Larry Diamond, ed., Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), and in particular, Diamond, “Conclusion: Causes and Effects,” pp. 425–428. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 39 
as well. “To survive, a constitution must have more than philosophical or logical appeal; it 
must be viewed by most citizens as worth defending.”
83 
Democratic consolidation is fostered by a number of institutional, policy, and behavioral 
changes. Many of these improve governance directly by strengthening state capacity, 
liberalizing and rationalizing economic structures, securing social and political order while 
maintaining basic freedoms, improving horizontal accountability and the rule of law, and 
controlling corruption in particular. Others improve the representative functions of democratic 
governance by strengthening political parties and their linkages to social groups, reducing 
fragmentation in the party system, strengthening the autonomous capacity and public 
accountability of legislatures and local governments, and invigorating civil society. Most new 
democracies need these types of institutional reform and strengthening. Some also require a 
steady program of innovations to reduce military involvement in nonmilitary issues and 
subject the military and intelligence establishments to elected civilian control and oversight. 
And some require legal and institutional innovations to foster accommodation and mutual 
security among different ethnic and nationality groups. 
Underlying all of these specific challenges, however, is an intimate connection between the 
deepening of democracy and its consolidation. Most third-wave democracies have not 
become consolidated, and those that show the clearest evidence of progress toward 
consolidation are liberal democracies. Significantly, none of the “nonliberal” electoral 
democacies that have emerged during the third wave has yet achieved consolidation.
84 And 
those electoral democracies that predate the third wave and that have declined from liberal 
to nonliberal status during it (India, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Colombia, Fiji) have shown signs 
of deconsolidation. 
Survey data on popular support for democracy and commitment provide a revealing 
measure of progress toward democratic consolidation. And surveys show what analysis of 
elite political behavior confirms: Spain, Greece, and Portugal were not only the first third-
                                                                                                                                                                                        
83  Barry R. Weingast, “The Political Foundations of Democracy and The Rule of Law,” forthcoming in the 
American Political Science Review. The quotation is from the December 1996 unpublished manuscript, Stanford 
University, p. 12. Weingast, too, emphasizes that while elites construct the institutional frameworks to limit the 
exercise of state power, credible commitment to the rules, sufficient to make them self-enforcing, must exist at the 
mass level as well. Thus stable democracy requires a very broad societal consensus defining “the boundaries of 
government action.” p. 14. While this approach is distinctive in conceiving the restraint of state power as involving a 
coordination problem among citizens, it has important affinities with Rustow’s transition model and Dahl’s discussion 
of “mutual security.” 
84  See the list of electoral, nonliberal democracies that have emerged during the third wave. Of those that have 
come into being since 1974 (which is most in this group) I know of not a single one that country and regional experts 
generally regard as consolidated by the terms employed here. Some pseudodemocracies – Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia, today, Mexico and Senegal in the past – could be considered as consolidated in a sense, but this 
sense is different than democratic consolidation, in that the stability it produces rests more on coercion and ruling 
party hegemony, and less on the voluntary belief in legitimacy (although that is far from unimportant in these cases). 
Thus, as Linz and Stepan, and Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle, as well as others have noted, the consolidation 
of democracies has characteristics that are quite distinctive in comparison with other regime types. 40 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
wave democracies, but the first to become consolidated.
85 The 1996 “Latinobarometro” 
survey found that 81 percent of the Spanish public agree that “democracy is preferable to 
any other form of government,” and 76 percent say they would defend democracy if it were 
under threat. Democratic legitimacy is similarly widespread in long-consolidated (pre-third 
wave) Costa Rica (80%, 85%).
86 Among Latin American third wave democracies, however, 
only Uruguay shows levels of public support for democracy (80%, 78%) so unambiguously 
high. Although Argentina and Panama approach these levels, their publics show significantly 
lower levels of satisfaction with “the way democracy w orks” in their country. Only in Costa 
Rica and Uruguay do levels of satisfaction with democracy reach (as in Spain) above 50 
percent. Levels of democratic commitment on the above three dimensions (support, defense, 
and satisfaction) appear closely associated with levels of democracy.  If we average the 
three dimensions of democratic commitment into an overall scale, the three countries that 
rank clearly highest – and are consolidated democracies – Costa Rica, Spain, and Uruguay, 
also have the most liberal average freedom scores in 1996  
Levels of democratic support and overall commitment tend to decline with lower freedom 
scores, and (with two exceptions) the lowest democratic support levels tend to be in the least 
democratic countries, Mexico and Guatemala (both of which had lower freedom scores prior 
to 1996).  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
85  For evidence of high levels of diffuse support for democracy as early as 1985, see Leonardo Morlino and José 
Ramon Montero, “Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe,” in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds., The 
Politics of Democratic Consolidation, pp. 235–239. 
86  More generally, the preference for democracy topped 75 percent in most EU countries in 1992 survey, and 
averaged 78 percent. Generally, the preference for authoritarian rule was less than 10 percent. Ibid, Table 7.2, p. 
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Table 7: Democratic Commitment and Levels of Democracy in Latin America, 1996 
Country  Support 
Demo-
cracy 
Satisfacti
on Demo-
cracy 
Defend 
Demo-
cracy 
Avg 
Demo-
cracy 
Commit-
ment 
Perceive 
Full 
Demo-
cracy 
Freedom 
Score 
Spain  81  57  76  71.3  29  1.5 
Costa Rica  80  51  85  72.0  23  1.5 
Uruguay  80  52  78  70.0  34  1.5 
Argentina  71  34  73  59.3  12  2.5 
Panama  75  28  75  59.3  13  2.5 
Bolivia  64  25  84  57.7  13  2.5 
Venezuela  62  30  74  55.3  16  2.5 
Ecuador  52  34  80  55.3  20  3.0 
Peru  63  28  75  55.3  14  3.5 
Nicaragua  59  23  72  51.3  7  3.0 
Colombia  60  16  74  50.0  7  4.0 
El Salvador  56  26  60  47.3  10  3.0 
Honduras  42  20  80  47.3  13  3.0 
Paraguay  59  22  59  46.7  9  3.5 
Brazil  50  20  69  46.3  4  3.0 
Chile  54  27  53  44.7  10  2.0 
Mexico  53  11  66  43.3  10  3.5 
Guatemala  51  16  56  41.0  6  3.5 
 
Source: Marta Lagos, essay forthcoming in the Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3, 1997. I am grateful to Dr. Lagos for 
permission to use this data here. 
 
Note:  Support is the precentage agreeing that “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.” 
Satisfaction is “with the way democracy works in [nation].” Defend democracy is willingness “to defend democracy if 
it was under threat.” Commitment averages these three percentages. Perceive democracy is the percentage who 
“think that democracy is fully established in [nation]” rather than “it is not fully established and there are still things to 
be done for there to be a full democracy.” Freedom Score is the average combined Freedom House rating on 
political rights and civil liberaties for 1996. 
 
The two exceptions are telling. Colombia shows middling levels of democratic support, which 
may be due to the presence of formal democracy in the country for four decades, but also 
the second lowest level of satisfaction with “the way democracy works” (second only to 
Mexico, which is still not an electoral democracy). And most strikingly, Chile is near the 
bottom in democratic support and overall commitment, despite the fact that it has the second 
most liberal freedom score. As Marta Lagos explains in her discussion of this data, this 42 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
skepticism seems to derive from two factors: the steady persistence of a pro-authoritarian 
segment of public opinion who view with favor the past military rule and accomplishments of 
General Augusto Pinochet and support his continued institutional role in politics; and broader 
popular frustration with the “authoritarian institutional lags”  – including General Pinochet’s 
continued command of the Army and the military’s constitutional role in government seven 
years after the transition to democracy.
87 In fact, as Linz and Stepan argue, the interlocking 
system of prerogatives for the military and its civilian appointees, embedded in the 1980 
constitution that General Pinochet left to the new civilian regime, so constrains the authority 
of elected governments and so insulates the military from democratic control that, until it “is 
removed or greatly diminished, the Chilean transition cannot be completed, and, by 
definition, Chilean democracy cannot be consolidated.”
88 Chile’s freedom score thus 
understates an institutional problem with its democracy that is deeply felt by its citizens, and 
that continues to divide the society. 
This returns us to the relationship between democratic deepening and democracy. Given 
wide disenchantment with corruption and “money politics” around the world, most citizens of 
most new democracies would not be inclined to think they have attained “full democracy.” As 
we see in Table 7, the percentages who believe their country has achieved “full democracy” 
are generally low, but they are higher in those countries with higher levels of democratic 
legitimacy (especially the three consolidated democracies). Again it is telling that Chile ranks 
so low here (at only ten percent) – the same as Mexico and El Salvador – and that Brazil has 
the lowest proportion of all. 
A similar relationship between regime legitimacy and level of democracy is apparent from the 
fourth New Democracies Barometer, administered in 1995 to 10 postcommunist countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe.
89 Although the survey items are not strictly comparable to those 
of the Latinobarometer, people who live in liberal democracies (states rated as “free”) are 
more likely to reject all authoritarian alternatives and to  approve the current regime while 
disapproving the previous communist one.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
87  See her essay on trends in supprot for democracy in Latin America, forthcoming in the Journal of Democracy 8, 
no. 3, July 1997, and also her “The Latinobarometro: Media and Political Attitudes in South America.” Papaer 
presented to the 1996 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29–September 1, San 
Francisco. 
88  Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 210. For their conceptual treatment of the problem, 
see pp. 3–5 and also pp. 207–211.  
89  Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, “New Democracies Barometer IV: A 10–Nation Survey,” Studies in Public 
Policy 262, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1996. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 43 
Tabel 8: Democratic Commitment and Levels of Democracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe, 1995 
Country  Rejection of all 
Authoritarian 
Alternatives 
Approve Current 
Regime minus 
Approve Old 
Regime 
Representative 
Democrats 
1995  
Freedom 
Score 
Czech Republic  80%  49%  75%  1.5 
Slovakia  71%  9%  69%  2.5 
Hungary  69%  12%  65%  1.5 
Slovenia  68%  39%  69%  2.5 
Poland  63%  51%  51%  1.5 
Romania  61%  32%  66%  3.5 
Bulgaria  55%  8%  65%  2.0 
Belarus  31%  – 42%  36%  5.0 
Ukraine  23%  – 42%  22%  3.5 
Russia  n.a.  – 31%  n.a.  3.5 
 
Source: Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, “New Democracies Barometer IV: A 10–Nation Survey,” Studies in 
Public Policy 262, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1996. 
 
Note: Rejection is of all three authoritarian alternatives: army rule, a return to Communist rule, and “to get rid of 
Parliament and elections in favor of a strong leader who can quickly decide everything.” Relative approval is the 
percent approving of the current regime minus the percent approving of the previous communist regime. 
“Representative democrats” (as Rose and Haerpfer term them) prefer parliamentary democracy to a “strong leader” 
and disapprove the suspension of parliament and abolishment of parties. 
The most democratically committed country by these various dimensions is also the one 
generally regarded as furthest along toward consolidation  – the Czech Republic – but these 
data confirm more generally the perception of rapid progress toward the entrenchment of 
democratic legitimacy and the consolidation of democracy in the six states of the former 
Warsaw Pact (as well as Slovenia). Particularly striking is the distinction between the six 
liberal democracies of Central Europe and the former Soviet states of Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus. Citizens of these latter states are significantly more likely to favor at least one 
authoritarian alternative to democracy and to approve of the old regime while disapproving of 
the new one.
90 
Romania appears as an anomaly, in that its levels of democratic commitment ranked it much 
higher among the postcommunist countries than would be predicted by its 1995 freedom 
score  – which may help to explain its embrace of a more democratic alternative in the 1996 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
90  In addition to Table 8, for more specific data on Russia and the other two states, see ibid, Table 3.1, p. 41. 44 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
presidential elections, and its movement during that year into the free category (with a 2.5 
average freedom score). This properly raises the question of the direction of causality: 
whether it is not the underlying political culture that presses a country toward a certain 
degree of democracy, as much as the objective conditions of democracy generating levels of 
appreciation for democracy that then become embedded in the political culture. Until the rise 
of the “transitions school” of democracy, with the work of Dankwart Rustow, and later 
Philippe Schmitter, Guillermo O’Donnell, Terry Karl, the former view was in fact the more 
common one, and even if what Rustow called “habituation” does play a key role in adapting 
political values to the institutional practice o f democracy, underlying cultural dispositions 
frequently appear to slow or accelerate the consolidation of democracy. Thus, both Marta 
Lagos and Richard Rose have posed the generally low levels of trust in both Latin American 
countries (as a result of deep cultural roots) and in post-communist countries (as a result of 
the atomizing structures and politically alienating experiences of communism) as problems 
for democratic consolidation, though in both regions political and economic performance also 
affects  levels of trust in institutions, and in postcommunist Europe the perception that 
freedoms have “a substantial and positive effect on trust in postcommunist institutions” (both 
political and market).
91 
As Linz and Stepan have forcefully argued, first with regard to Spain and now with respect to 
other third wave democracies, citizens of a new democracy are able to distinguish between 
the political and economic diminensions of regime performance, and may come to value 
democracy for the political goods it produces even when its economic performance is 
perceived to be poor and costly in the short term. Part of this owes to the fact that citizens of 
postcommunist Europe have proven to be more patient and realistic in their time horizons for 
economic improvement than many observers expected. But much of it owes as well to the 
real improvements they perceive in what Linz and Stepan call the “political basket of goods” 
during the first few years of democracy. By early 1993, proportions ranging from 60 to 98 
percent of  all citizens in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania responded that the current political system was better than the previous one in 
giving people freedom to join any organization they want, to say what they think, to travel 
and live wherever they want, to “live without fear of unlawful arrest,” to “decide whether to 
take an interest in politics,” and to choose whether or not to practice a religion. On these six 
dimensions of freedom, across the six national samples, the percentage recognizing a better 
political life was was often 85 to 90 percent, and the mean percentage seeing the current 
political system as better was 84 percent. Only in Bulgaria (on freedom of speech) did as 
many as 10 percent perceive the situation worse, and overall the mean percentage saying 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
91  See Lagos in the Journal of Democracy, forthcoming, Richard Rose, “Postcommunism and the Problem of 
Trust,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3 (July 1994): 18–30; and William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Trust, Distrust 
and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Society,” revised version of 
a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Tampa, Florida, November 
1995. The quotation is from Mishler and Rose, p. 19. I H S — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — 45 
political conditions were worse was 2.5 percent.
92 Support for democracy is thus related to 
the “sense of freedom form state oppression [that] is felt throughout the postcommunist 
societies of Central and Eastern Europe. People may be dissatisfied with their current living 
standards or fearful of losing their jobs, but they have not forgotten the great gains made in 
freedom from fear and censorship.”
93 By comparision, Russian perceptions (in mid-1993) of 
greater freedom on these six dimensions were positive but less overwhelming, ranging from 
36 to 71 percent, with a mean of 60 percent, and only 51 percent felt there was more 
freedom to live without fear of unlawful arrest.
94  
The above data support a developmental perspective on democracy. The less respectful of 
political rights, civil liberties, and constitutional constraints on state power are the behaviors 
of key state, incumbent party, and other political actors, the weaker will be the procedural 
consensus underpinning democracy. Consolidation is then obstructed, by definition. 
Furthermore, the more shallow, exclusive, unaccountable, and abusive of individual and 
group rights is the electoral regime, the more difficult it will be for that regime to become 
deeply legitimated at the mass level (or to retain such legitimacy), and thus the lower will be 
the perceived costs for the elected president or the military to overthrow the system (or to 
reduce it to pseudodemocracy). Consolidation is then obstructed or destroyed causally, by 
the effects of institutional shallowness and decay . To become consolidated, therefore, 
electoral democracies must become deeper and more liberal. This requires greater 
executive (and military) accountability to both the law and the scrutiny of o ther branches of 
the government, as well as the public; reduction of barriers to political participation and 
mobilization by marginalized groups; and more effective protection for the political and civil 
rights of all citizens. 
Beyond (but partially overlapping with) deepening, two other general processes foster 
consolidation. One is movement toward routinized, recurrent and predictable patterns of 
political behavior. This involves the settled convergence around (and internalization of) 
common rules and procedures of political competition and action. And this, broadly, is what 
“institutionalization” is all about. The third process involves regime performance. Over time 
and a succession of specific governments, if not in the short run, the democratic regime must 
produce sufficiently positive policy outputs to build broad political legitimacy, or at least to 
avoid the crystallization of substantial pockets of resistance to the regime’s legitimacy. The 
content of these policy outputs, and the judgement of what constitutes “sufficiently positive” 
outcomes, will vary across countries; the greater the cultural predisposition of the society to 
value democracy intrinsically, the less positive these policy outputs will need to be.  
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6. A Fourth Wave? 
Precisely because democracy emerges incrementally, in parts, and often unpredictably, 
analysts and policymakers should be cautious in writing off the prospects for democratic 
development of any country. In several of the most repressive countries in the world, 
particularly I raq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba, even modest political liberalization will 
probably require the death or overthrow of the long-ruling tyrant or clique. Aside from Kuwait, 
the oil-rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf, led by Saudi Arabia, have so far shown little 
appetite for any kind of political opening. But rigidity in the face of social change and 
frustration can make a regime more vulnerable to breakdown (all too often, as in Iran, into 
another very different kind of authoritarianism).  No calculus of regime futures should dismiss 
the possibility for suprise. Few foresaw the collapse of Soviet and East European communist 
regimes, and several of the most repressive regimes in the world are brittle and unstable. 
Under challenge from violent insurgencies, the authoritarian regimes in Sudan and Zaire are 
particularly vulnerable. Indeed, by mid-April 1997, the 30–year reign of Mobutu Sese Seko 
was palpably crumbling, albeit with no guarantee that the rebel forces of Laurent Kabila 
would provide significantly more democratic government.  Burma and Nigeria have articulate 
democratic movements with passionate support in their societies, and some combination of 
domestic mobilization, internal divisions in the regime, and international pressure could 
trigger democratic change. This is true as well for a number of repressive multiparty regimes 
in Africa, such as Kenya and Cameroon, that were thrown on the defensive by domestic and 
international pressure in the early 1990s and could be again (particularly if ethnically 
fragmented oppositions unite in the next elections). 
For most of the 53 “not free” states, the prospects for democratization appear poor in the 
near term. As Freedom House noted in its report on 1994, 49 of these states share one or 
more of the following three characteristics: 
–  they have a majority Muslim population and often strong Islamic fundamentalist 
pressures; 
–  they have deep ethnic divisions without a single, dominant ethnic group (that has over 
two-thirds of the population); 
–  they have neo-Communist or post-communist regimes with a strong hangover of 
diffuse, one-party domination.
95 
Many of these countries have two (and even a few, three) of these characteristics. In 
addition, the “not free” states are disproportionately poor (20 of them are classified as low-
income by the World Bank). Poverty in itself does not preclude democratic development, but 
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it does significantly shorten the average life expectancy of a democracy, especially in the 
absence of sustained economic growth.
96 When it is combined with one or more of the other 
conditions above, it significantly diminishes the democratic prospect. 
This does not render pointless the continuation of democracy promotion efforts on the part of 
the established democracies. International pressure for democracy will not be effective 
unless it has some consistency in its rhetoric and expectations, and since we cannot 
confidently predict where a combination of regime divisions, civil society mobilization, and 
unforeseen events might spawn a democratic breakthrough, there is a logic to broadly 
distributed efforts. Who would have predicted a democratic transition in Sierra Leone in 1996 
– or for that matter in Russia in 1991? 
Nevertheless, most such efforts will at best till the soil for longer term political change. If this 
analysis is right, the number of democracies will not soon increase much, and the most 
effective efforts will take a very long-term time perspective, seeking gradually to help lay the 
foundations for market economies, constrained centers of p ower, rules of law, more 
resourceful civil societies, and the incremental emergence of competitive electoral processes 
beginning (as in Taiwan and elsewhere) at the local level. For countries where economic 
growth is likely to create better educated, more informed, pluralistic, and autonomously 
organized societies in the coming generation – China, Vietnam, Indonesia, – what Minxin Pei 
has termed for China “creeping democratization” seems a more realistic prospect, and a 
compelling rationale for a long-term  strategy of engagement by the established, wealthy 
democracies.
97  
Most significantly, the “long term” is probably not that far away. Given the likelihood that they 
will sustain relatively high growth rates in per capita income (averaging 4.5 percent 
annually), Henry Rowen projects that by 2020 China and Indonesia would have per capita 
incomes (in 1990 dollars, expressed in “purchasing power parity”) of $6,600 and $8,800 
respectively.
98 These income levels lie in the middle to upper-middle reaches of economic 
development which Huntington has identified as the characteristic “zone” for democratic 
transitions in the third wave.
99 “Not only Taiwan and South Korea, but Spain, Portugal, Chile, 
and Argentina all made the democratic transition in this range” of $5,000 to $7,000 in per 
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capita income,
100 and $7,000 (in 1990 U.S. dollars, expressed in purchasing power parity) is 
roughly equivalent to the threshold at which, Adam Przeworski and his colleagues argue 
(based on the 1950–1990 experience of regime change) “democracies are impregnable and 
can be expected to live forever.”
101  
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More significantly still, if we think of democracy as not merely present or absent but typically 
emerging in fragments and degrees, the fragments are beginning to emerge in China as it 
crosses the threshold of $2500 per capita income.
102 This was the same income level at 
which political opening and pluralization began to gather momentum in Taiwan in the early 
1970s.
103 And as in Taiwan then, a key early element of political change lies in the increasing 
autonomy of local-level authority and the introducation of at least partially competitive and 
free elections for local governing bodies. This process is still nascent or experimental in 
China, but it has led to the defeat of Chinese Communist party candidates in more than a 
trivial share of the elections, and it is coinciding with a wide array of other changes in the 
nature of governance in China: the cumulation of economic and political decentralizing 
trends into “a nascent federalist structure;” the e mergence of a “system of law” that at least 
begins to constrain the autonomy of public officials and the potential for arbitrary exercise 
and abuse of power; the recent rapid growth of court suits by citizens and groups challenging 
the administrative decisions of various government authorities at the local level (with 
challenges winning some redress more than a third of the time); the institutional maturation 
and growing autonomy of the National People’s Congress and various provincial and local 
People’s Congresses; the increasing pluralism of the mass media and of access to 
information in general; and the rapid growth of semi-official and private (as opposed to state 
or party-controlled) associations  – such as those of lawyers, private entrepreneurs, 
consumers, and environmentalists  – that are “civic” in their concerns to articulate interests 
and affect public policy, as well as in their creation of social capital through the horizontal 
organization of individuals as self-motivated citizens.
104  
As in Taiwan and Korea, and before that most classically in Spain, economic development is 
creating a more complex and pluralistic society in China that cannot be managed with the old 
patterns of monolithic and highly repressive and arbitrary state domination. With communist 
ideology largely spent in its potential to legitimate Communist Party rule, the regime 
increasingly recognizes, Pei and others argue, that it must provide institutional mechanisms 
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to limit corruption and abuse of power, and to enable citizens to express their interests and 
concerns and to protest and challenge state actions. Without this adaptation and 
normalization of state-society relations, regime legitimacy could evaporate completely, 
protest could spin out of control, and economic dynamism or the regime itself could be swept 
away. Thus, China is now embarked on a slow, incremental course of political liberalization 
that regime leaders view (no doubt to varying degrees by various factions) as necessary to 
their own survival. As the new institutions are practiced with growing scope and 
sophistication around the country, they generate norms and expectations that will make their 
reversal increasingly costly and dangerous, and that will generate a demand for further 
expansion of democratic practices and procedures over time. In this way, continued 
economic development and social change could well bring a long period of rising political 
pluralism and civil freedom in China. Chinese history, and many other regime transitions, 
suggest that the process is not likely to be smooth, continuous, and free of conflict. Gradual 
movement toward democracy could disintegrate into chaos due to demographic pressures, 
ecological decay, and fiscal disarray.
105 Such a regime collapse could plunge the country into 
destabilizing protest, violence, and repression, or propel it forward urgently into some kind of 
democratic framework. But the early signs of predicted doom  – a crippling power struggle 
and reversal of economic reforms following the death of Deng Xiaoping  – have so far not 
surfaced. More likely, even with factional struggle, unanticipated crises, and temporary 
reversals, the pressure from below will continue pushing China toward “creeping 
democratization,” as Chinese leaders run “a race against time” to establish new, more 
participatory, decentralized, and law-based institutions before the old ones give way to “a 
crisis of governability.”
106 Whether or not these trends produce an electoral democracy by 
Rowen’s statistically projected year of 2015, they seem likely to create a much  more 
democratic system, to at least move China to semi-democracy (and almost certainly with 
less effective central control than now prevails in the tiny city-state of Singapore).  
Should China undergo such substantial political liberalization in the next two decades, 
raising its average freedom score, to, say, 4, and even more so if it should cross a threshold 
to truly competitive electoral democracy at the national level, the diffusion effects throughout 
East Asia and the world would be enormously powerful – powerful enough to launch a fourth 
wave of democratization. Even more modest continued political opening in China will likely 
co-exist with similar, and in some cases, more rapid or decisive democratizing trends in other 
East Asian countries. Indonesia, which may well be as rich (or more so, or nearly so) in 2020 
as South Korea was in 1990, is already facing growing pressures from organized labor and 
the middle classes for democratic change. As personal income and educational levels rise 
rapidly and interest groups accumulate much more power (in resources, ideas, and will) to 
act indepently of the state, Indonesia will become a prime candidate to make the kind of 
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democratic transition, driven substantially by civil society mobilization from below, that 
occurred in Korea and Taiwan.
107 If Rowen’s estimates prove more or less reasonable, 
Thailand will have by 2020 a per capita income of $17,000 (in 1990 PPP dollars)  – roughly 
equivalent to Italy or the UK in 1990. Thailand is already a robust (if also roguish) electoral 
democracy; in another generation, the levels of broadly distributed income and education 
that would have been produced by such growth would make much more difficult the levels of 
neopatrimonial relations, raw vote-buying, and military influence that constrain the quality of 
democracy in Thailand today. At such a level of development, a military coup would be 
unthinkable  – something that no country with even half that level of per capita wealth has 
experienced. 
The same assumption of high growth (averaging 4.5% annually) would lift Vietnam to $2,600 
per capita income in 2020, at the level of China today. But Vietnam is likely to be much more 
democratic in 2020 than China is today, given the evolution it has already undergone (similar 
to China in many respects) to expand the role of the National Assembly, to separate the 
party bureaucracy from the operation of government, to decentralize political administration, 
to subject government to constraints of law, to implement a market economy and attract 
foreign investment, and to redefine its legitimacy on bases other than Marxist ideology. 
Indeed, Vietnam’s historic competition with China and increasing exposure to the forces of 
international (primarily Western) capitalism may accelerate the pace of political transition. 
Thus Frederick Z. Brown concludes, “Many within the VCP (Vietnamese Communist Party) 
recognize that Marxist-Leninist ideology is succumbing to the forces of science,e ducatino, 
cultural exchange, and the marketplace. These fact o f modern life would appear to make 
‘peaceful evolution’ in Vietnam inevitable, leading initially to a softer authoritarianism and 
perhaps later to a more sophisticated participatory system of governance.”
108 
Some time in the next decade or two, Singapore’s uniquely anomalous status as the world’s 
richest non-democracy (the one true exception to the “threshold” thesis of development and 
democracy) also seems likely to yield to changing realities. The maturation of a new 
generation, socialized into affluence with more “postmaterialist” values, can be expected to 
produce broader resentment of rigid, hierchical state control, paternalistic dictation from the 
ruling party, and lack of the accountability that comes from real political competition. Already, 
the popular vote for the ruling People’s Action Party has declined from it’s 70 percent-plus 
levels of the late 1968–1980 period to the low 60–percent range since 1984  – and this with 
virtually no effective opposition party. Moreover, the passing from the scene of  the grand 
architect of the system, Lee Kuan Yew, could aggravate tensions within the regime over 
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leadership succession. Finally, there is much to suggest that the stability of 
pseudodemocracy in Singapore has derived not from nondemocratic and deeply rooted 
“Asian values” but from a pragmatic bargain, in which the regime produced dynamic material 
progress and the people offered political compliance and quiscence in exchange  – but only 
for those policies and institutions that could be rationalized as necessary for continuing the 
economic miracle.
109 If the miracle fades, if economic growth declines from the 7 percent 
annual rate that Singapore averaged in the 1980s and early 90s to the muddling 2 to 3 
percent growth rates more characteristic of advanced industrial societies (not to mention the 
possibility of stagnation or a prolonged recession), the historic bargain of “pragmatic 
materialism” will fray and quite possibly unravel. China’s ambition to make Shanghai the 
preeminent financial center in the region may put increasing economic pressure on 
Singapore. For various reasons then, pressure for a more competitive, democratic political 
system can be expected to rise, although a transition to democracy is by no means 
inevitable.
110  
In the Islamic Middle East as well, democracy seems least implausible in the long run. 
Culturally and historically, this has been the most difficult terrain in the world for political 
freedom and democracy. But Islamists, increasingly, do not speak with one voice, and 
democratic pluralists currents are emerging. A “growing group of Islamic reformers” is 
struggling with “the question of how to modernize and democratize political and economic 
systems in an Islamic context.”
111 Moreover, democratic reforms have already progressed 
significantly in Jordan, which now has the highest average freedom score (4.0) of any Arab 
country. Most of all in Jordan, evolution toward constitutional monarchy and electoral 
democracy is apparent. A competitive and pluralistic regime could potentially develop in the 
Palestinian authority in the West Bank and Gaza, if peace with Israel could somehow be 
achieved, and if the strong urge for democratic participation evidenced in the January 1996 
elections is not crushed by intolerance and repression by the ruling elite.  
In the predominantly Muslim states of the Arab world, if democratization is to be sustainable 
(or even feasible), it will probably need to unfold in what Bernard Lewis calls “gradual and 
unforced change” that proceeds “in slow stages” through reforming a utocracy to more open 
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and competitive political systems.
112 An abrupt democratic opening could trigger a neo-
authoritarian reaction from a faction of the ruling elite, or a breakthrough to an Islamic 
fundamentalist regime that would have no use for democracy or liberalism. Yet even 
incremental democracy must give an increasingly wide berth to social criticism, political 
dissent, and independent associations and parties. Except for Jordan, Lewis’s other two 
examples of “modernizing autocracies” that are “moving toward greater freedom”  – Morocco 
and Egypt  – in fact offer little or no scope for the people to change their government or to 
mobilize peacefully for fundamental reform. The time to begin a process of real political 
liberalization in these and other Middle Eastern countries is long overdue, and the costs of 
further delay could be considerable. Most of the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East are 
highly corrupt and are experiencing growing challenges to their legitimacy. Continued 
decadent and repressive rule enables Islamic fundamentalist movements, which take refuge 
in the mosque and build alternative networks of support and exchange in the economy, to 
establish themselves as the principle alternative to increasingly unpopular regimes that 
permit no other avenue of change. Ignoring these trends could be costly for the global cause 
of democracy. 
In the near term, there are clearly other serious challenges and potential dangers. Many 
Asian political leaders and intellectuals will continue to challenge “ Western” notions of what 
constitutes good government, and to advance models of “democracy” that vary from illiberal 
to entirely illusory. In the midst of prolonged economic stagnation, inequality, corruption, and 
massive crime, democracy in Russia could still give way to some kind of nationalist or 
neocommunist dictatorship, with demonstration effects and reintegrationist pressures 
reverberating through the region.  Blocked by the military from democratizing, Nigeria could 
drift from military dictatorship to anarchy or even civil war, dragging down the prospects for 
democratic development throughout West Africa.  
Still, the possibility of a fourth wave of democratization in the world rests most pivotally on 
the future of China.  Factional political leadership struggles in China could interrupt or 
reverse political liberalization, producing an increasingly repressive, hostile, and nationalistic 
China that intimidates democracies (and potential democracies) throughout the region. The 
long shadow of Chinese hostility to democracy will, in the short term, hang over Hong Kong 
and Taiwan in any case. But if the West in general and the United States in particular 
assume that China seeks an authoritarian and expansionist regional hegemony, and if they 
pursue overt policies to “contain” the presumed Chinese “threat,” they are much more likely 
to turn the regime away from internal reform and external accommodation. Peaceful 
engagement with China, and separation of trade relations from human rights and security 
concerns,  does not require that the West abandon its principled commitments to human 
rights – and its steady work to get China to live up to its own commitments in this regard.  
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Unless the established democracies fumble into a “new cold war” along civilizational lines 
with China, greater China, or Islamic Middle Eastern states, most of the above potential 
setbacks to freedom are likely to be temporary or limited in scope. If more and more 
countries continue to liberalize and open their economies in ways that create secure property 
rights and expanded trade and investment, there could well be, as Henry Rowen predicts, an 
extraordinary period of “world wealth expanding” ahead, in which much of the developing 
and postcommunist world experiences dramatic gains in per capita income within a 
generation. In addition, it is almost certain, as Rowen shows, that educational levels will 
steadily rise in developing countries. Together, these two forces are going to generate, as 
Rowen argues and much other evidence suggests, highly propitious conditions for 
democracy. This will particularly be so in the part of the world where growth will be most 
rapid and socially transformative  – East Asia.
113 Within a generation, East Asia’s richest 
economies – most of all, Taiwan and South Korea, possibly Thailand as well – will likely be 
not just electoral democracies but consolidated liberal democracies. And several of today’s 
Asian autocracies will be moving toward democracy. 
In the long run, the expansion of world wealth and education figures to be the most powerful 
structural factor facilitating the expansion and deepening of democracy. But as I have tried to 
emphasize throughout, democratic development is probabilistic, open-ended and reversible. 
Economic and social development will help, but ultimately political leadership, choice, and 
action at many levels will make the difference. This imposes strong obligations not only on 
government officials, political parties, interest groups, and civic organizations in developing 
democracies, but on organizations and governments in rich, established ones. What the 
latter do (or do not do) to offer technical, financial, and political support for improving and 
institutionalizing fragile democracies can make much more of a difference than was once 
supposed. 
In the near to medium term, if some of the third wave democracies achieve real 
consolidation in the coming decade; if many of the electoral democracies find their way 
forward, or back, to a deeper, more liberal political order, where the rule of law is 
institutionalized; and if the world’s richest and most powerful democracies sustain the 
pressure for global movement toward democracy (albeit at different paces), the prospect for 
democracy in the early twenty-first century appears quite positive. A third reverse wave will 
have been preempted  – even if some fledgling democracies break down  – and the 
foundations for a fourth wave of democratic expansion will be laid. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
113  Henry S. Rowen, “The Tide Underneath the ‘Third Wave,’“ Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 
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Appendix 
 
Classification of States by Regime at End of 1996
114 
Liberal 
Democracies 
 
1.5 
 
 
 
 
2.0 
(Nonliberal) 
Electoral 
Democracies 
1.0  Bahamas      
  Belgium  Benin  3.0 
Andorra  Cape Verde  Botswana   
Australia  Costa Rica  Chile  Bangladesh 
Austria  Czech Republic  Greece  Brazil 
Barbados  Estonia  Guyana  Dom Republic 
Belize  France  Israel  Ecuador 
Canada  Germany  Korea, South  El Salvador 
Cyprus  Grenada  Latvia  Honduras 
Denmark  Hungary  Mali  India 
Dominica  Italy  Nauru  Madagascar 
Finland  Japan  Taiwan  Nicaragua 
Iceland  Lithuania  Vanuatu  Papua New Guinea 
Ireland  Mauritius  Western Samoa  Seychelles 
Kiribati  Monaco    Slovakia 
Liechtenstein  Palau  2.5  Suriname 
Luxembourg  Poland    Thailand 
Malta  St. Kitts & Nevis  Argentina   
Marshall Islands  St. Lucia  Bolivia  3.5 
Miconesia  St. Vincent &  Bulgaria   
Netherlands  Grenadines  Jamaica  Fiji 
New Zealand  Sao Tome &  Malawi  Ghana 
Norway  Principe  Mongolia  Guatemala 
Portugal  Slovenia  Namibia  Guinea-Bissau 
San Marino  Solomon Islands  Panama  Macedonia 
Sweden  South Africa  Romania  Moldova 
Switzerland  Spain  Philippines  Mozambique 
Tuvalu  Trinidad &          Venezuela  Nepal 
United States  Tobago    Paraguay 
  United Kingdom    Russia 
  Uruguay    Ukraine 
       
       
                                                                                                                                                                                        
114  States are listed in order of their average freedom house score at the end of 1996. For the scores, see 
Freedom Review  28, no. 1   (January-February 1997), pp. 15-16. All "free states" are listed here as liberal 
democracies. A listing of all electoral democracies is obtained from Freedom House. Classification of the remaining 
countries into "pseudodemocracies" and "authoritarian regimes" is by the judgement of the author. 56 — Larry Diamond / The End of the Third Wave — I H S 
 
(Nonliberal) 
Electoral 
Democracies 
Continued 
4.5 
 
Armenia 
Burkina-Faso 
Ethiopia 
6.5 
 
The Gambia 
Kenya 
 
 
4.0  Gabon  Authoritarian   
  Malaysia  Regimes (One-   
Albania  Singapore  party or No-party)   
Central African 
Republic 
Zambia     
Colombia       
Congo  5.0  4.0  7.0 
Croatia       
Georgia  Morocco  Uganda  Afghanistan 
Kyrgyz Republic  Tanzania    Bhutan 
Lesotho  Zimbabwe  5.0  Burma 
Sri Lanka      Burundi 
  5.5  Eritrea  China 
4.5    Kuwait  Cuba 
Haiti  Azerbaijan    Equatorial Guinea 
Pakistan  Chad  5.5  Iraq 
Sierra Leone  Cote d’Ivoire    Korea, North 
Turkey  Guinea  Djibouti  Libya 
  Kazakhstan  Swaziland  Saudi Arabia 
5.0  Lebanon  United Arab  Somalia 
  Togo  Emirates  Sudan  
Bosnia-  Tunisia    Syria 
Herzegovina  Yemen  6.0  Tajikistan 
      Turkmenistan 
Pseudo- 
democracies 
 
6.0 
Brunei 
Maldives 
Vietnam 
    Oman   
3.5  Algeria     
  Angola     
Antigua &  Belarus  6.5   
 Barbuda  Cambodia     
Mexico  Cameroon  Bahrain   
Peru  Egypt  Iran   
  Indonesia  Laos   
4.0  Mauritania  Liberia   
  Niger  Nigeria   
Comoros  Yugoslavia  Qatar   
Jordan    Rwanda   
Senegal    Uzbekistan   
Tonga    Zaire   
 